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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY         
 
WHY A NEM REPORT CARD? 
 
Reliable, affordable electricity supply is a key foundation of the prosperity and quality of life 
enjoyed in modern developed nations.  Recognising the importance of electricity, Australian 
federal and state governments have over the past two decades created the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) with the stated objectives of developing and operating electricity 
supply infrastructure to facilitate low-cost, safe, reliable and efficient electricity supply.  The 
objective of the NEM is explicitly stated in the National Electricity Law as the “National 
Electricity Objective” (or “NEO”): 
 
s. 7—National electricity objective 
The objective of this Law is to promote efficient investment in, and efficient 
operation and use of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of 
electricity with respect to— 
(a) price, quality, safety, reliability and security of supply of electricity; and 
(b) the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity system. 
 
Having such an explicit objective invites the question of how well this objective is being met.  
However, this simple question is surprisingly difficult to answer for three reasons.   Firstly, 
the objective is not clearly defined.  The limited set of criteria included in the NEO creates 
potential conflicts both with other relevant criteria which are excluded and with the broader 
“long term interests of consumers”.  Secondly, there is very limited reliable and consistent 
data available across the range of criteria to measure the NEM’s performance in pursuit of 
its objective. Thirdly, the NEO sits within a broader set of Australian energy policy objectives 
that impact on the electricity sector, through policies and measures that are ‘external’ the 
NEO and the National Electricity Market  (see Section 3.2.2).   
 
This raises the question of whether it is efficient and effective for the “interests of 
consumers” to be so divided between included and excluded criteria, and for the aims of the 
electricity market to be split between internal and external drivers. 
 
This report seeks to assess how well the National Electricity Market serves the long term 
interests of Australian consumers by considering in detail these two issues: 
 What does “the long term interests of consumers” mean?  
 How well is the National Electricity Market performing when measured against a 
series of criteria that might reasonably be applied to the National Electricity 
Objective? 
 
Drawing on this analysis, the report offers some observations on how the NEM and the NEO 
might be reformed to serve better the long term interests of consumers. 
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As this is the first time that such comprehensive assessment of the performance of the NEM 
against its objective has been attempted, there are likely to be some limitations.  There are 
three particular limitations that should be highlighted.  The first is that, consistent with 
Australia’s liberal democratic traditions, consumers themselves are considered to be the 
best judges of what constitutes “the long term interests of consumers”.  While it is of course 
possible to survey a sample of consumers’ views directly on this matter, it was beyond the 
scope of this project to do so.  Instead, we used the more limited approach of surveying the 
views of consumer representative and advocacy organisations. 
 
The second major limitation is as noted above, that data available to assess the 
performance of the NEM is far from complete and reliable.  In some cases, no appropriate 
data could be found to assess performance against key criteria. In other cases, there was a 
lack of consistent time series data to assess trends, or a lack of comparable international 
data against which to benchmark Australia’s performance. While the report seeks to provide 
robust indicators wherever possible, for the criteria of quality and safety, the data was 
either unavailable or insufficient and as such no grade is given.  
 
The third major limitation was that, due to both the absence of relevant data and the 
absence of suitable precedents, it was necessary to apply a degree of judgement in 
converting the collected data into specific “grades” for each performance criterion.  While 
the authors have sought to do this as objectively and transparently as possible, it should be 
noted that the grades given in this NEM Report Card are not a definitive statement of fact, 
but simply the best assessment of performance based on the available evidence.  
 
Recognising these limitations, the NEM Report Card is intended not as a critique of the NEM 
or its institutions, but as a tool to understand where greater attention or effort may be 
required in order to improve performance.  
 
It should be noted that these limitations are not intrinsic to the Report Card process.  With 
more time and resources to collect data directly from market participants and stakeholders, 
as well as more complete and consistent reporting in the NEM, each of these limitations 
could be overcome in future performance assessments. 
 
NATIONAL ELECTRICITY OBJECTIVE AND THE INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS 
 
Before assessing the performance of the NEM against its objective, it is necessary to define 
specifically what “the long term interests of consumers” means. As noted above, the 
National Electricity Objective is directed towards “the long term interests of consumers of 
electricity with respect to — (a) price, quality, safety, reliability and security of supply of 
electricity...” 
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The choice of which criteria should be included in the NEO has been contentious since the 
establishment of the NEM.  Other criteria have had both explicit and implicit elements of 
electricity market objectives in the Australian predecessors to the NEM and in overseas 
electricity markets.  In order not to prejudge what consumers consider to be in their 
interests, this research sought to explore views about both the existing criteria and possible 
additional criteria that could be included in the NEO. 
  
A range of representatives of consumer organisations, as well as other key stakeholders 
were surveyed as to how they perceived the long term interests of consumers. 
 
There was strong agreement that those criteria already included in NEO – price, quality, 
safety, reliability and security of supply – are important elements of consumers’ interests.  
However, there were also a number or other criteria that stakeholders, and in particular 
consumer representatives, believed were also important to consumers’ interests.  These 
included environmental performance, protection of vulnerable consumers, energy efficiency 
and demand management. While not formally incorporated into the NEO, these all fall, at 
least to some extent within the formal Australian energy policy objectives outlined in the 
2011 Draft Energy White Paper.1 This report therefore highlights the potential value of 
incorporating these objectives into the NEO.  The results of this survey are summarised in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Which other criteria should be in the NEO? (Survey results, all stakeholders)  
 
 
The NEM Report Card draws on both the existing criteria and these additional possible 
criteria in assessing the performance of the NEM.   
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PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET 
 
This Report explores the performance of the NEM from a number of perspectives.  The 
simplest of these was to ask stakeholders how well they thought the NEM was performing in 
meeting its objective as currently defined in the National Electricity Law. Just over half of 
survey respondents (53%) stated that the NEM was performing poorly or very poorly, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: How well is the NEM meeting its objective? (Survey response) 
 
 
In order to understand the basis for stakeholders’ views of the NEM, a series of additional 
questions was posed. For example, stakeholders were asked how well they thought the 
NEM was performing in relation to the existing criteria of the National Electricity Objective. 
In relation to four of the five criteria, the NEM was generally seen to be performing well or 
very well (see Figure 3).  Only in the area of price were strongly negative views dominant. 
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Figure 3: How well is the NEM meeting the existing criteria of the NEO? 
 
 
Stakeholders were also asked how well they thought the NEM was performing in relation to 
the other possible criteria that could be included in the National Electricity Objective.  As 
these criteria are currently excluded, it is not surprising that the NEM was seen as not 
performing as well in these areas (see Figure 4). The NEM was seen to be particularly weak 
in relation to environmental performance, demand management and customer energy 
efficiency.  
 
Figure 4: How well is the NEM meeting other possible criteria for the NEO? 
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The research project then sought to gather data to compare these subjective stakeholder 
perspectives with objective quantitative data on the performance of the NEM for both 
existing criteria for the NEO and potential additional criteria.    
 
For each priority criterion, one or more Key Performance Indicators were identified and data 
was sought for each.  Benchmarks of performance were established and a “grade” was given 
in reference to these benchmarks. Wherever possible, international benchmarks of 
performance were used.  Where this was not possible, the performance was benchmarked 
against historical trends within Australia or the NEM. 
 
The outcomes of this detailed analysis are summarised in the National Electricity Market 
Report Card below.  In general the results of this data analysis and grading correspond quite 
closely to the results of the stakeholder survey (see Table 1).   However, there were some 
notable exceptions.  In the case of prices, the NEM was rated by most stakeholders as 
performing poorly or very poorly.  However when measured against the international 
benchmarks and recent trends, the NEM received a Fair or “C” grade.   Similarly, over 50% of 
the surveyed stakeholders gave the NEM a poor or very poor rating for customer bills, while 
the Report Card ranked it as a creditable “B”.  
 
Table 1: NEM Performance Ranking –  Stakeholder Survey versus Report Card 
Current NEO Criteria Stakeholder Survey  
Grade 
Report Card 
Grade 
Reliability B B 
Security of Supply C C 
Quality C Ungraded 
Safety  B Ungraded 
Price D C 
Possible New NEO Criteria   
Customer bills D B 
Environmental performance D F 
Energy efficiency D D 
Demand management D D 
Protection of vulnerable consumers D C 
Customer satisfaction C C 
Level of Competition C B 
 
Overall, both on the basis of the limited data currently available and stakeholder 
perspectives, it appears that the NEM is doing a fair to good job of serving those elements 
of the “long term interests of the consumer” that are currently included in the NEO.  
However, for criteria that are not currently included in National Electricity Objective, with 
the exception of Customer Bills and Level of Competition, the performance of the NEM 
ranges from fair to very poor.   
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The National Electricity Market Report Card – 2011 
KEY:   A= Very good;    B= Good;    C= Fair;    D= Poor;    F= Very Poor;    Ungraded= insufficient data 
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 Reliability B 
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
Reliability Unserved Energy (USE) 
Security C Estimated Security Unserved Energy (USE) 
Quality Ungraded Customer Severity Index (CSI) 
Safety Ungraded Lost time injury frequency 
Price C 
Retail price of electricity for residential customers 
(c/kWh) 
Retail price of electricity for small business customers 
(c/kWh) 
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Customer bills B 
Average annual residential customers electricity bill 
as a proportion of household expenditure 
Environmental 
performance 
F 
Annual greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity 
sector (tonnes CO2e/year) 
Greenhouse gas intensity of electricity supply           
(kg CO2e/MWh) 
Renewable energy as a proportion of total electricity 
generation  (% of total MWh) 
Energy 
efficiency 
D 
Electricity savings from energy efficiency programs as 
% of total electricity consumed (% of total MWh) 
Demand 
management 
D 
Proportion of peak demand met through demand 
management programs (% of total MW peak) 
Protection of 
vulnerable 
customers 
C 
Number of disconnections of residential customers 
on payment plans and pensions 
Number of households that are 'energy poor'           
(electricity costs > 10% of household budget) 
Customer 
satisfaction 
C 
Number of complaints per year 
Surveyed customer satisfaction 
Level of 
competition 
B 
Extent of generation market concentration 
Extent of retail market concentration 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Based on the analysis for this Report Card, a number of conclusions can be drawn and three 
recommendations are offered.    
 
The first conclusion is that there is quite limited publicly available data on the performance 
of the NEM in relation to the long term interest of consumers.  This is the case for the 
existing and possible additional criteria included in the National Electricity Objective.  
Whichever criteria are included in the objective of the National Electricity Market, it is 
crucial that more relevant, reliable and consistent data be collected and reported.  It is 
therefore recommended that more comprehensive reporting be undertaken with regards to 
NEM performance.  
 
Recommendation 1:  That the Standing Council on Energy and Resources requires annual 
public performance reporting of the National Electricity Market against the criteria of the 
National Electricity Objective. 
 
Ideally, this should include annual reporting of specific quantitative and qualitative Key 
Performance Indicators against performance benchmarks relevant to the long term interest 
of electricity consumers, as presented in this Report Card.  This reporting could be included 
in the AER’s annual State of the Energy Market Report.  Such annual reporting would 
highlight where the NEM is performing well and help to identify potential areas for 
improvement.   
 
As noted above, the lack of data relates to both criteria currently included in the NEO and 
criteria excluded from the NEO.  However, while supply side reporting is deficient, 
(particularly for Safety, Quality and Security) there is a pronounced lack of information 
available on the demand side of the market (particularly for Energy Poverty, Energy 
Efficiency, Demand Management and Customer Satisfaction).   This shortcoming should be 
addressed even if there is no change to the current National Electricity Objective. 
 
Recommendation 2:  That public reporting on the performance of the NEM should be 
extended for the consumer side of the market, particularly in relation to customer bills, 
customer energy efficiency, demand management, protection of vulnerable customers 
and customer satisfaction. 
 
The second conclusion is that if consumers’ interests are to be well served by the NEM, then 
it is important to reflect the views of the consumers themselves as to what their interests 
are.   
 
In the most recent round of reforms of the National Electricity Market, social and 
environmental objectives were deliberately excluded.  Research for this report indicates 
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that consumer advocates clearly identify that the social and environmental impacts of the 
NEM affect the long term interest of consumers.  The Report Card results suggest that the 
current policy of seeking to achieve social and environmental outcomes in the electricity 
sector only through policies external to the NEM and the NEO has not delivered very good 
results either in practice or according to stakeholders perception, and may even have 
adversely impacted on some consumer interest criteria within the NEO, such as price.  Given 
that all decisions in the NEM are considered against the NEO, there is likely to be significant 
benefit in incorporating environmental and social criteria for the long term interest of 
consumers into the NEO. International precedents for the inclusion of social and 
environmental consideration into the formal objectives of the electricity markets can be 
found in the US, Canada and the UK.  
 
Recommendation 3:  That the National Electricity Objective should be amended to 
incorporate social and environmental criteria for the long term interest of consumers in 
addition to the existing technical and price criteria.   
 
This Report Card has found that the NEM is not performing well against a series of social and 
environmental criteria, such as customer satisfaction, protection of vulnerable consumers, 
greenhouse gas emissions (both total emissions and emissions intensity per unit of energy 
generated), demand management, energy efficiency and renewable energy. Including the 
full range of criteria for the long term interests of consumers, would make the implicit 
trade-offs that are already being made more transparent within the decision making 
processes of the NEM.   
 
While the inclusion of social and environmental criteria within the NEO would probably not 
lead to immediate changes in the operation or performance of the NEM, their inclusion 
would be likely to lead to consideration of policy and rule changes where appropriate and 
greater attention by NEM institutions to addressing poor performance in these areas.  
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0. INTRODUCTION 
 
From its beginning as a state-based regulated monopoly model of electricity supply common 
around the world until the late 1980s, the Australian electricity market has been extensively 
restructured and transformed over the past two decades.   National competition policy 
developed and adopted in the mid 1990s supported the move towards a national electricity 
market. Following the creation of the National Electricity Market (NEM) in 1998, the 
Australian Energy Market (AEM) was formally established in 2004.  New national market 
institutions were introduced – the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), the 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER) and the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) – and 
important energy market roles were divided between the existing and new bodies.  These 
changes resulted in the separation of policy making, rule making, energy market 
development, economic regulation and market rule enforcement. New laws, regulations and 
rules have been introduced that form the federal legislative framework supporting the 
establishment of the AER, the NEM, and other bodies responsible for the development, 
operation, and regulation of the energy market. Non-economic distribution and retail 
functions are currently being transferred into the national framework, with the National 
Retail Law 2011 representing another important stage in the creation of a truly national 
energy market.  
 
The intended status of consumers as the primary beneficiaries of the NEM is formalised in 
the current national electricity market objective (the NEM objective or NEO):  
 
To promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use of, electricity 
services for the long term interests of consumers of electricity with respect to – 
a. price, quality, safety, reliability, and security of supply of electricity; and 
b. the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity system. 
 
The NEM objective, provided for in section 7 of the National Electricity Law (the NEL), came 
into force in 2005.  To the casual observer, the NEM objective clearly spells out five key 
factors or criteria affecting consumers’ long term interests – price, quality, safety, reliability 
and security of supply, and the integrity the electricity system itself – and the means by 
which these goals are to be achieved, namely efficient investment and use. This represents a 
marked shift away from the previous multiple market objectives set out in the National 
Electricity Code 1998 (NEC) and before that in the National Grid Protocol (‘NGP objectives’), 
1992. Whilst the NGP objectives incorporated the key global and domestic environmental 
concerns of that time – climate change and greenhouse gas emissions – the NEC objectives 
directly reflected the national competition policy principles underpinning the establishment 
of the NEM in 1998. 
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The broader impact of the NEM objective is evident in the functions of the key market 
institutions that are responsible for the functioning and oversight of the NEM. The AEMC, 
the AER and the AEMO are all required to take account of the NEM objective in the exercise 
of their various functions.  Whilst these key market institutions are also required to report 
on many aspects of their roles in the NEM, this public accountability function does not 
appear to extend to a specific, regular and direct assessment of NEM performance against 
the NEM objective. In other words, there is no explicit and detailed reporting on whether 
the NEM is working in the long term interests of electricity consumers.  
 
The shift to the current single NEO has major ramifications for electricity market 
stakeholders and consumers. Important questions include whether the NEO is indeed being 
achieved within the NEM’s current governance, regulatory and legislative framework and 
whether the current NEO suitably reflects the long term interests of consumers, as 
perceived by consumers (and other market stakeholders).  
 
0.1 PROJECT PURPOSE AND OUTCOMES 
 
This research project was initiated by the Total Environment Centre (TEC) in response to the 
extensive and ongoing reforms of the National Electricity Market, which currently include 
the transition of non-economic distribution and retail functions into the national sphere. As 
such, the key outcome of this research project is a Report Card on the NEM, which assesses, 
as far as possible, the extent to which the NEM is meeting the long term interests of 
consumers.  This research project set out to answer the following questions: 
 
What are the long term interests of consumers – as viewed by consumers and other 
market stakeholders? Do these accord with the interests set out in the NEM 
objective?  
 
Is the NEM working in the long term interests of consumers? 
 
Who is responsible for ensuring that the NEM is meeting the long term interests of 
consumers?  
 
How could the NEM’s performance be improved both against the current stated 
objective and against what consumers and other market stakeholders consider to be 
the long term interests of consumers? 
 
The main outputs of this research are a NEM Report Card (Section 4) and a series of 
recommendations for addressing the long term interests of consumers within the NEM 
(Section 5).  The purpose of the Report Card is to communicate clearly and concisely how 
well the NEM is operating in the long term interests of consumers.  As such, a significant 
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focus of this report is on identifying indicators that appropriate for judging the long term 
consumer interests within the NEM. The choice of performance measures can have a 
powerful impact on the behaviour of institutions.  As author Donella Meadows observed, 
“indicators arise from values (we measure what we care about) and they create values (we 
care about what we measure).2 
 
0.2 METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
 
The NEM Report Card grades a series of criteria for assessing the long term interest of 
consumers. Key performance indicators (KPIs) associated with each criterion provide the 
basis for the grade.  The following seven-part methodology was employed to gather the 
information and data necessary to develop the NEM Report Card. 
 
1. An initial literature review of Australian and international industry reports, academic 
articles and inquiry submissions was undertaken to identify the views of stakeholders 
on the objective and the performance of the NEM. 
 
2. From the literature review, 13 possible criteria and 48 associated KPIs for the long 
term interests of consumers were identified. 
 
3. A stakeholder survey was then developed and sent to 59 organisations to gauge: 
a) What they think are the long term interests of electricity consumers; 
b) What they believe to be the best KPIs to measure the performance of the 
NEM with respect to those long term interests; 
c) The adequacy of the current National Electricity Objective; and 
d) How well they think the NEM is performing with respect to the current 
objective. 
 
4. Criteria and associated KPIs were then prioritised based on the literature review and 
survey results, to finalise which criteria should be included in the Report Card.  
 
5. Data was sought and a method for scoring each KPI was developed.  
 
6. Appropriate benchmarking measures for each KPI were identified and a 
corresponding grade assigned.  
 
7. The grades for each KPI were averaged to provide an overall grade for each criterion 
for the long term interests of consumers.  These grades were then collated into a 
Report Card (Section 3.2).   
 
A detailed outline of the methodology is provided in Appendix A.  
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The literature that was reviewed in the preparation of this report included background 
material related to the reforms in the Australian Energy Market, the establishment of the 
NEM and specific discussions on the long term interests of electricity consumers. This review 
included an examination of relevant published reports and unpublished documents and 
investigated different market participants’ opinions relating to the objectives of the NEM 
and the long term interests of consumers. The materials obtained through the literature and 
document review were then considered within the context of the governance, regulatory 
and legislative regime underpinning the NEM and the development of a single market 
objective.  The existing NEM objective was compared and contrasted with its predecessors, 
and strengths and weaknesses are highlighted throughout the discussion.  
 
0.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
 
This Report consists of five main parts, some of which contain several sections.  Parts 2 to 5 
relate directly to the four research questions outlined above. 
 
Part 1 sets out the background for this Report including a history and overview of the NEM 
and the changing nature of the market objective. 
 
Part 2 outlines the key organisations within the NEM and discusses their responsibilities 
with respect to the current NEO and the broader long term interests of consumers.  
 
Part 3 addresses the question: What are the long term interests of consumers?  To do so, 
the results of the stakeholder consultation regarding the long term interests of consumers 
and the NEO are set out.  An appraisal of the NEO policy and of regulatory and legislative 
issues is also provided.  Additionally, the NEO is compared with international examples.   
 
Part 4 consists of five sections responding to the question: Is the NEM operating in the long 
term interests of consumers?  To do this an overview of the KPIs and criteria included in the 
Report Card is given in Section 4.1.  The NEM Report Card is set out in Section 4.2. Section 
4.3 outlines and grades the KPIs used in the Report Card.  These are ordered into different 
categories or criteria for the long term interest of electricity consumer.  Section 4.4 provides 
survey respondents’ views on NEM performance and compares these to the Report Card 
results.  Section 4.5 discusses the implications of the KPI scoring process and outcomes. The 
specific methodology for this part of the research project is set out in Appendix A at the end 
of the Report. 
 
Part 5 concludes the report by setting out key recommendations arising from this research 
project. 
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1. HISTORY OF THE NEM AND THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY OBECTIVE 
 
Energy market reform has been a key feature of successive Australian governments’ policy 
decision-making and legislative functions for several decades. Since the early 1990s, 
extensive restructuring of the electricity sector has been accompanied by ongoing reform of 
the NEM’s legislative, governance and regulatory framework. These changes have been 
discussed and analysed by a multitude of public and private stakeholders and independent 
commentators.  It is not the purpose of this research project to engage in an in-depth study 
of the considerable dialogue on energy market reforms to date, but this part of the Report 
briefly examines key NEM reforms and developments, both past and present.  The rationale 
for including this background information is twofold. First, the reforms to date have 
impacted widely upon the rights and/or responsibilities of key decision makers and the 
various market stakeholders, especially consumers. The introduction of several new key 
bodies, for instance, has altered the governance and regulatory framework of the NEM. 
Secondly, it is important that the information and data obtained through this project is 
interpreted in the context of an understanding of the historical reforms and their 
ramifications for the NEM and its various participants. 
 
1.1.MOVING TO A COMPETITIVE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET 
 
A great deal of the NEM’s present characteristics can be traced back to the micro- and 
macro-economic reforms of the past three decades.3  Indeed, the current NEM is vastly 
different from the vertically integrated, state-owned monopoly utilities of the 1970s.4 Key 
features of the national energy market reform agenda emerged during the 1980s and 1990s.  
These included the introduction of competition into the electricity market, disaggregation of 
the electricity sector and its assets, and the establishment of a uniform, single wholesale 
electricity market in eastern and southern Australia.5  
 
Since the introduction of the National Competition Principles in 1995, competition policy has 
been a key driver of reforms in the electricity sector.6 The introduction of competition 
principles at each stage of the electricity transaction – generation, transmission, 
distribution, retail and end-use/consumption – occurred in several ways including: (i) linking 
previously independent state and territory electricity markets into an interconnected, single 
competitive wholesale market; (ii) pooling generated electricity and trading it across the 
participating jurisdictions; (iii) facilitating full contestability across the market by allowing 
customers to choose their own supplier (including generators and retailers); and (iv) 
ensuring – through legislation – non-discriminatory access to the interconnected 
transmission and/or distribution network.7 
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1.1.1. COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE MARKET 
 
Consideration of the NEM to date reveals that the first of these principles – the 
establishment of a competitive wholesale market – has clearly been achieved. Five 
jurisdictions – Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, the Australian Capital Territory and 
South Australia – have been participants in the wholesale exchange, pooling and trading 
generated electricity between them since the NEM’s commencement in 1998. By 2006 the 
NEM had expanded to include Tasmania, whose physical integration into the NEM occurred 
with the commissioning of the Basslink Interconnector, a subsea electricity cable facilitating 
submarine electricity transmission between Tasmania and mainland Australia. 8   As a 
consequence, the NEM provides electricity to almost eight million end users and trades an 
estimated A$8 billion of energy on an annual basis.9 It achieves this over a distance of more 
than 4000 kilometres, making it one of the longest interconnected power systems in the 
world.10  
 
1.1.2. COMPETITIVE RETAIL MARKET 
 
In contrast to the wholesale market, the introduction of competition into the retail 
electricity sector of the NEM has been neither uniform, nor timely, across the six NEM 
jurisdictions. For instance, while Victoria first introduced retail competition for large 
industrial consumers in 1994, the transition to full retail competition was not achieved until 
2002.11 Likewise, NSW’s transition to full retail competition occurred progressively between 
1996 and 2002.12  According to the Australian Energy Regulator’s most recently available 
annual report: 
 
All NEM jurisdictions except Tasmania have introduced full retail 
contestability (FRC) in electricity, allowing all customers to enter a contract 
with their retailer of choice. At 1 July 2009, Tasmania extended contestability 
to customers using at least 150 megawatt hours (MWh) per year. Small 
business customers that consume more than 50 MWh per year are expected 
to become contestable on 1 July 2011. All jurisdictions have introduced FRC in 
gas retail markets.13 
  
Another competition-related complexity, arising in respect of the transition of retail 
functions to the national sphere of responsibility, is the differing nature of price cap 
regulation across the various NEM jurisdictions. The AER recently commented on this in the 
following terms: 
 
In the transition to effective competition, price cap regulation continues to 
apply in several jurisdictions. At July 2010 all jurisdictions except Victoria 
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applied some form of price cap regulation for electricity services ... Australian 
governments have agreed to review the continued use of retail price caps and 
to remove them if effective competition can be demonstrated. The AEMC is 
assessing the effectiveness of retail competition in each jurisdiction, to advise 
on ways to remove retail price caps. The relevant state or territory 
government makes the final decision on this matter.14 
 
1.2.KEY PHASES OF REFORM  
 
Since its establishment, the governance, legislative, and regulatory regime of the NEM has 
been subjected to ongoing reform. Three key phases can be identified: (i) Phase 1 (1991–
1998); (ii) Phase 2 (1998–2004): and (iii) Phase 3 (2005–present).  Key aspects of reforms 
during these phases of the NEM’s development are briefly considered in the following 
sections.  The changing nature of the market objectives is also outlined and summarised in 
Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
1.2.1. PHASE 1: 1991–1998 
 
In 1991, the National Grid Management Council (the NGMC) was established to facilitate a 
‘co-ordinated electricity market spanning the eastern States, South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory’.15  In 1992, the National Grid Protocol (NGP) was introduced.  
The NGP articulated the ‘rules, responsibilities and technical requirements for connecting to 
the National Grid and participating in trading in bulk electricity through it’.16 In 1992, an 
important intergovernmental body was established, namely the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG).17  Throughout the 1990s, COAG continued to work towards a national 
electricity market. In 1994 for instance, COAG agreed to the need for accelerated 
microeconomic reform across the electricity sector.18 More specifically, COAG agreed that 
‘structural separation of generation, transmission and distribution, together with uniform 
network pricing and regulation, were ... necessary to ensure effective implementation of a 
competitive electricity market’. 19  In addition to improving national and international 
competitiveness, other benefits said to flow from the widespread electricity market reforms 
included increasing customer choice, reducing prices, and promoting greater sustainable 
utilisation of energy resources.20   
 
In addition to dealing with the political and physical practicalities of linking the separate 
markets, it was necessary to harmonise the laws governing electricity markets in individual 
state and territory jurisdictions. 21  During this phase, COAG endorsed a cooperative 
legislative scheme – an applied legislation mechanism of harmonisation – that resulted in 
the legislature in one jurisdiction, South Australia, taking the lead role in respect of energy 
legislation on a given matter, with the South Australian legislation then mirrored and 
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applied by the other jurisdictions.22  This cooperative legislative process gave rise to the 
foundation statute, the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996, which was 
subsequently reproduced in all of the NEM’s participating jurisdictions.  These legislative 
developments are set out in Table 2 which is discussed in Part 1.4 below.  
 
In the early 1990s, the initial stages of moving towards a national electricity market saw 
environmental factors assume an important role in its stated objectives. During this phase, 
the national market objectives were set out in the NGP, and all of them gave strong focus to 
the important relationship between energy supply and use and the environment. These 
objectives are set out in Table 3 below. For instance, in addition to being efficient and 
economic, electricity industry development was to be environmentally sound. Likewise, the 
criteria for the maintenance and development of the performance and/or utilisation of the 
power system were to be technically, economically and environmentally sound.  
 
1.2.2. PHASE 2: 1998–2004 
 
In early 1994, COAG determined that ‘regulatory arrangements for the national electricity 
market’ would be ‘consistent with reforms of competition policy’ and that these would 
include ‘regulation of certain elements of the operation of the market by way of a code of 
conduct’ under the auspices of the ACCC and the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).23  
Legislation, drafted to support the establishment of the national market, came into 
existence in 1996, and entered into force upon the NEM’s commencement in 1998.24  The 
National Electricity Law laid the foundations for the legislative and regulatory framework of 
the NEM, while the National Electricity Code (the Code) set down the code of conduct for 
the NEM. At this time, the market objectives were contained in the Code and showed a 
marked shift away from the environmentally sound provisions of the NGP objectives.25  The 
National Electricity Code set down a series of market objectives, which where 
complemented by a further list of Code objectives.  These are set out in greater detail in 
Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
The NGMC and NGP were subsequently replaced by this new cooperative legislative and 
regulatory framework, which came into effect with the commencement of the NEM in 
December 1998. The national legal basis of this new national market was founded in three 
legal instruments: the National Electricity Law,26 the National Electricity Code (the Code), 
and the then newly introduced Part IIIA27 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).28  Key 
market institutions introduced at this time included the National Electricity Code 
Administrator (NECA) and the National Electricity Market Management Company 
(NEMMCO). The NECA,29 was vested with the primary responsibility for administering the 
Code and was expected to:  
(i) promote the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of the national electricity 
market; and  
9 
 
(ii) lead the development of the market towards more competitive, market-
oriented outcomes in order to deliver a viable market that benefits end-use 
customers.30   
 
The second market institution, NEMMCO, was responsible for the day-to-day administration 
and operation of the National Electricity Market. 31  In addition to ensuring continual 
improvement of the NEM’s efficiency, NEMMCO was required to balance electricity supply 
and demand through the establishment and operation of a wholesale spot market.32 
NEMMCO’s other responsibilities included registering code participants, establishing 
reporting and consultation procedures,33 and coordinating, planning for, and maintaining 
the power system security.34  
 
Further policy developments and far-reaching national reforms were introduced into the 
NEM between 2000 and 2004. This included moves towards the establishment of the 
Australian Energy Market (AEM) and an appropriate national energy policy framework to 
support the national market. COAG’s Communiqué of 8 June 2001 provides the foundations 
for many of these more recent energy market reforms.35 In particular, COAG unanimously 
endorsed the importance of securing a cooperative agreement – between all Australian 
governments – on energy issues generally, the need for efficient operation of domestic 
energy markets and the creation of an effective policy framework to direct future energy 
policy decision making and enhance policy certainty for all energy users.36 In the same year 
the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) was established.  At that time, the MCE’s key role 
was to provide effective policy leadership on national energy matters and to commission an 
independent market review.37  
 
1.2.3. PHASE 3: 2004–PRESENT 
 
COAG’s 2004 Intergovernmental Agreement on Energy and the ensuing Australian Energy 
Market Agreement (the AEMA) sit at the centre of the most recent series of Australian 
energy market reforms.38 Through the AEMA, all of the Australian governments have 
expressly endorsed many of the recommendations of the 2003 Parer Report,39 especially the 
recommendation for the development of a truly national and efficient energy market.40 The 
AEMA set out the new national governance, regulatory and legislative framework of the 
Australian Energy Market – and the NEM – and required all Australian governments to enact 
complementary legislation to ensure a harmonised, cohesive national legislative scheme is 
created in support the national energy market. As such the AEMA has been said to have 
significantly enhanced the governance arrangements of the Australian Energy Market, and 
in turn the NEM, by ‘separating policy making, rule-making and energy market 
development, economic regulation and market rule enforcement’.41 In short, the AEMC was 
made ‘responsible for rule-making and energy market development at a national level, 
including in respect of the National Electricity Rules’42, while the AER has assumed 
10 
 
responsibility ‘for economic regulation and compliance at a national level, including in 
respect of the Australian Energy Market Legislation’.43 The MCE is still required to make 
policy in relation to the energy market. In this capacity, the MCE is vested with responsibility 
for overseeing the new national policy agenda, governance and institutional framework set 
out in the AEMA.  
 
In mid 2011, COAG decided to merge two existing ministerial councils – the MCE and the 
Ministerial Council on Minerals and Petroleum Resources (MCMPR) – into one body called 
the Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER).   The first meeting of the SCER took 
place on 9 December 2011.44  As yet, these changes have not been reflected in the NEL and 
this nascent body has not yet engaged in any major governance activities in the NEM. 
Accordingly, the future functions and powers of this new body are not considered further in 
this report.  However, it should be noted that in future the former role of the MCE will now 
be performed by the SCER. 
Further aspects of the market reforms during this phase, including the introduction of a new 
NEM objective, are discussed further in the following sections. 
 
1.3.NEW LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEM 
 
A range of legislative measures have been introduced to provide the requisite federal 
legislative framework to support the establishment of the Australian Energy Market, and in 
turn the current NEM and the various bodies vested with responsibility for its development, 
operation, and regulation.45 New electricity laws, rules and regulations have replaced the 
pre-existing electricity legislative scheme – the National Electricity Law, National Electricity 
Rules and the Code.46 The current national electricity legal framework is set out in the third 
column of Table 2 below. Collectively known as the National Electricity Laws,47 the NEL 
2005, National Electricity Regulations and the National Electricity Rules provide the requisite 
legal basis for the regulation and operation of the wholesale electricity market and they 
provide a framework for the economic regulation of electricity transmission and 
distribution.48  The NEL 2005 lays down the legislative framework underpinning their 
functions, duties and powers. Importantly, through the establishment of these two national 
bodies, relevant policy and governance matters have effectively been separated from the 
day-to-day administrative, operational and regulatory matters. The AEMC and the AER have 
been vested with a range of new legislative powers and functions, whilst the AEMO has 
assumed the primary responsibility for managing the day-to-day operation of the NEM 
(power system and the electricity wholesale spot market) and is required to take account of 
the NEO in this role.49   
 
The NEL 2005 contains provisions relating to legal proceedings under that Act,50 to practices 
and procedures for making National Electricity Rules51 and to the safety and security of the 
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national electricity system.52 The National Electricity Laws are supported by the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010.  The Australian Energy Regulator was established in 2004 and is 
governed by Part IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (the CCL 2010, formerly the 
TPA 1974), which came into effect as of 1 January 2011.  
 
Two significant developments in the new electricity legislative scheme concerned the new 
market objective, which focuses on the long term interests of consumers, and the new legal 
status of the national electricity rules. These are set out in sections 7 and 9 of the NEL 2005: 
 
7  National electricity market objective 
The national electricity market objective is to promote efficient investment in, 
and efficient use of, electricity services for the long term interests of 
consumers of electricity with respect to: 
a. price, quality, safety, reliability, and security of supply of electricity; and  
b. the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity system.53  
 
9  National Electricity Rules to have force of law 
The National Electricity Rules have the force of law in this jurisdiction.54 
 
Table 2: Key legislative developments in the NEM  
1992 1998-2005 2005 to 2011  
National Gas 
Protocol 
National Electricity (SA) Act 
199655 
National Electricity (SA) Act 1996 
(as amended)56 
 
 National Electricity Law 
199657 
National Electricity Law 1996  
(as amended) (the NEL 2005)58  
 
The 
National 
Electricity 
Laws 
National Electricity Code59 National Electricity Rules60 
National Electricity (SA) 
Regulations 199861 
National Electricity (SA) 
Regulations (amended)62  
Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth) (the TPA) 
Competition & Consumer Law 2010 
(Cth) (formerly the TPA) 
 
 National Energy Retail Law (South 
Australia) Act 201163 
 
  National Energy Retail Law
64  
  National Energy Retail Rules
65  
  National Energy Retail 
Regulations66 
 
 
The NEO has an important influence on the manner in which the AEMC and the AER perform 
their functions: both are legally required to take account of the NEO in the exercise of their 
various powers. The changing nature of the NEO over the three key phases of the NEM’s 
development is summarised in Table 3 and Table 4 below.   
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Table 3: Changing market objectives 1992 to the present 
NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET OBJECTIVE/S 
PHASE GENERAL SPECIFIC CRITERIA SOURCE 
PHASE 1 
 
 
1992 
TO 
1998 
 
Electricity industry development Efficient 
Economic 
Environmentally sound 
National Grid 
Protocol 1992 
(i) 
Power system: maintenance & 
development of performance &/or 
utilisation 
Technical 
Economic 
Environmental 
(ii) 
Further environmental considerations Ecologically sustainable development 
Specific environmental requirements 
 
(iii) 
PHASE 2 
 
 
1998 
TO 
2005 
National Competition Policy Competitive market National 
Electricity Code 
1998 
1.3(1) 
Customer choice Full retail contestability 1.3 (2) 
Access neutrality  Full network access  
(transmission & distribution network) 
1.3 (3) 
Participant neutrality  New entrants & existing participants 
treated the same 
Prohibit anti-competitive behaviour 
1.3 (4) 
Energy source & technology neutrality  Energy sources & technologies 
treated the same 
Prohibit anti-competitive behaviour 
1.3 (5) 
Intra- & inter-state trading neutrality  Uniform inter- & intra-state trading 
regulations 
Prohibit anti-competitive behaviour 
1.3 (6) 
PHASE 3 
 
 
2005  
TO 
CURRENT 
Single NEM objective – long term 
interests of consumers  
Efficient investment in electricity 
services 
Efficient  operation & use of 
electricity services 
National 
Electricity Law 
2005 
s.7 
Electricity supply Price  
Quality 
Safety 
Reliability 
Security of supply  
s.7 
 
National Electricity System Reliability 
Safety 
Security 
s.7 
 
 
More recent legislative developments have focused on the transfer of distribution and retail 
energy regulation functions to the AER and AEMC.  The MCE – through two key working 
bodies67 – has taken lead responsibility for the development of the legislative and regulatory 
framework, known as the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF). This includes the 
recently passed National Energy Retail Law (South Australia) Act 2011, and the National 
Energy Retail Regulations and Rules, both of which are yet to be finalised, and are set out in 
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Table 2.68 As noted by the AER, the MCE ‘agreed on 10 December 2010 that jurisdictions 
would work towards a common target date of 1 July 2012 for commencement of the new 
law, rules and regulations’.69  Given this timeline, further discussion of the NECF is outside 
the scope and purpose of this Report. 
 
Table 4: Additional objectives: Phase 2 (1998–2005) 
NATIONAL ELECTRICITY CODE OBJECTIVES 
GENERAL SPECIFIC CRITERIA SOURCE 
Achieve the market objectives  Light-handed” regulation National 
Electricity  Code 
1998+ 
1.4(b)(1) 
Set of market-oriented rules   Market operations 
 Power system security 
 Network connection 
 Access & network services pricing 
1.4(b)(2) 
Dispute resolution  Provide cost-effective framework 1.4(b)(3) 
NE Code breaches  Provide for adequate sanctions 1.4(b)(4) 
NE Code changes  Provide efficient processes 1.4(b)(5) 
Technical & market operations  Responsibilities of all Code participants 
 Detailed market rules, including bidding, 
dispatch, spot price determination & 
settlements arrangement 
 Detailed operational requirements (incl. 
Power system operations & security, 
emergency operations, metering & 
maintenance scheduling) 
 Terms and conditions of access & 
technical standards for connection to the 
network 
 Pricing network services methods. 
1.4(b)(6) 
(i)-(v) 
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2. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NEM? 
 
2.1.CHANGING MARKET INSTITUTIONS, PARTICIPANTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
The changes to the nature and number of institutions and market participants in Phase 3 of 
the NEM’s development have been significant.  In addition to the introduction of new key 
bodies, several market participants have seen their roles change, while other bodies have 
been abolished altogether. By way of an overview, the new governance arrangements, 
together with the new division of functions and powers between existing and new energy 
market institutions, have been summarised in Table 5.  Key governance and regulatory 
changes of the past half-decade concern the roles of the MCE, the AMEC, the AER and the 
AEMO.  
 
Table 5: Key National Energy Market institutions and Key Responsibilities 
KEY BODY DATE 
START 
KEY RESPONSIBILITY 
ACCC 1995 
 
Competition regulation, industry code access and authorisations.  
ACT 2004 Merits review. 
AEMC 2004 Rule-making and energy market development 
AEMO 2009 Market manager – the day-to-day operation of the NEM (power 
system and the electricity wholesale spot market). 
AER 2005 Economic regulation and market rule enforcement, distribution and 
retail (2010 onwards). 
COAG 1992 Intergovernmental agreement on energy policy and future market 
development. 
ERIG 2006 Established by COAG to investigate and make recommendations on 
future NEM reforms in respect of the efficiency of market structures, 
the transmission network and energy financial markets’ 
performance. Dissolved in 2007 following completion of report. 
FCA  1995 Judicial review. 
MCE 2001 Policy making (SCO, Retail Policy Working Group & Joint 
Implementation Group).  
NECA 1998  Code Administrator – dissolved 2004. 
NEMMCO 1998 Market Manager – dissolved 2009. 
NET 1998 Merits Review – dissolved 2004. 
RELIABLITY 
PANEL 
2005 Monitor, review, report and provide advice on the safety, security 
and reliability of the national electricity system (under auspices of 
AEMC). 
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The NEL 2005 lays down the legislative framework underpinning the functions, duties and 
powers of the key NEM institutions. Importantly, through the establishment of these 
national bodies, relevant policy and governance matters have effectively been separated 
from the day-to-day administrative, operational and regulatory matters. The functions and 
powers of these market institutions is discussed in great detail elsewhere, in particular on 
the websites of each institution, and need not be reproduced in detail here. However, it is 
useful to draw attention to several noteworthy features of their respective roles in the 
NEM and highlight key changes to the NEM’s governance and regulatory framework.  
 
2.1.1.  THE AEMC AND THE MCE 
 
The AEMC is vested with the primary responsibility for rule making in the new national 
market. Relevantly, s 34 of the NEL 2005 sets down the subject matter and nature of the 
National Electricity Rules which the AEMC may make in the course of performing its specific 
functions and powers. The AEMC can make rules with respect to the operation of the NEM 
and the activities of market participants.70  Further to specific rule making and market 
development functions, the AEMC has also been vested with a broad power to ‘do all 
things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its 
functions’.71 More importantly, in exercising its functions and powers, the AEMC is required 
to have regard to the national electricity market objective noted previously,72 and to take 
all necessary steps to ensure confidential information provided to it is protected from 
unauthorised use or disclosure.73  
 
To date, the AEMC and the MCE have effectively shared the governance sphere of the 
NEM.  As mentioned previously, COAG has recently established a new body (SCER) which 
will, broadly fulfil the former role of the MCE. The full scope of the functions and powers of 
this new body as are yet not expressed in legislative form are therefore outside the 
discussion in this Report.  
Under the current legislative scheme, the MCE (presumably in future, SCER)  is required to 
liaise with the AEMC on matters of market development, can initiate a proposal for a NEM 
rule change and publish statements of relevant energy policy principles.74  It is also 
required to take the NEO into consideration.75 Two working groups have been formed 
within the MCE Standing Council of Officials – the Retail Policy Working Group and the Joint 
Implementation Group – both of which have been assisting with the development of 
legislative and regulatory arrangements regarding the transfer of energy distribution (non-
economic) and retail regulation functions to the national energy market in the MCE 2007 
legislative package. Making sure that the necessary structure of consumer protections is 
fully accounted for in the new regulatory regime – known as the National Consumer 
Protection Framework – has been a central feature of this process. A range of critical 
consumer issues has been consulted on, including retailer obligations for supply to small 
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customers, customer market contracts and marketing.76 Consequently, this has been an 
extremely important process for consumers in all NEM jurisdictions.  
 
2.1.2. THE AER AND THE AEMO 
 
The AER operates under the broad mantle of the ACCC and is the principal energy regulator 
of the Australian Energy Market.77 Most of the existing regulatory powers and duties of the 
ACCC in relation to the electricity market have been transferred to the AER. Thus, as the 
pre-eminent regulator in the energy industry, the AER has a pivotal role in the operation of 
the market and regulation of the conduct of market stakeholders across the NEM. In this 
capacity, the AER has had primary responsibility for economic regulation of the NEM’s 
wholesale market and the transmission and distribution networks. The AER’s role is 
expanding at present to encompass non-economic regulation of the NEM’s retail markets. 
The functions and powers of the AER are contained in Part 3 of the NEL 2005, together with 
requirements on the manner in which such functions and powers are to be exercised. 
Section 15 of the NEL 2005 sets out the general functions and powers of the AER, while 
Section 16 focuses specifically on the manner in which the AER must perform or exercise its 
economic and regulatory functions or powers. The latter section states that, in addition to 
having regard to the national electricity objective78 when making a determination (e.g. 
transmission), the AER is also required to ensure that relevant market participants are 
properly informed about matters under consideration and that they have an opportunity to 
make submissions accordingly. Also, the AER must ensure that affected parties have a 
reasonable opportunity to recover costs of compliance with regulatory obligations, as well 
as provide effective incentives to promote economic efficiency in the provision of 
electricity services. Like the AEMC, the AER is also required to observe legal requirements 
regarding the confidentiality of information provided to it in the course of its operations.  
 
The AEMO has assumed the role of market manager and as such, is primarily responsible 
for managing the day-to-day operation of the NEM (power system and the electricity 
wholesale spot market). Under s 49 of the NEL, the AEMO’s functions include operating, 
administering and improving the effectiveness of the wholesale exchange, registering 
participants and maintaining and improving the power system security. The AEMO is also 
required to take account of the NEO in its energy market role.79   
 
While each of the key market institutions are clearly empowered to take account of the 
NEO in their various actions, there is no single body vested with the sole responsibility of 
ensuring that the NEM does in fact meet the NEO. That is not to say that the current 
institutions fail to meet their statutory obligations.  On the contrary, a cursory examination 
of the AMEC’s rule change procedures, for instance, makes it clear that the AEMC requires 
proponents to take the NEO into consideration in relation to any proposed rule change.  
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However, over and above the general responsibility imposed on each body to take the NEO 
into account and to act consistently with the NEO, it is not clear who is accountable in 
practice for the NEO being met and how such accountability applies. For example, while 
there are very large amounts of data collected and reported against a wide range of 
criteria, there is not currently any specific accountability mechanism in place to evaluate 
the extent to which the NEM is meeting the market objective.  Greater transparency in 
respect of such matters, including the basis upon which the key market institutions 
determine that their actions and/or decisions satisfy the NEO, would provide greater 
certainty and improved understanding of the roles of the key market institutions in 
ensuring the NEM operates efficiently in the long term interests of consumers. 
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3. THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND THE NEO 
 
Part 3 of this Report considers what are the long term interests of consumers and how do 
they relate to the current and past electricity market objectives? The history of these 
developments from the early 1990s to the present day explored above are drawn upon, 
with the intention of highlighting both the present and historical importance of the 
integration of several core principles into the framework of the NEM and the effectiveness, 
or otherwise, of the NEO in the context of meeting the long term interests of consumers.  
By way of comparative analysis, brief overviews of energy market experiences outside 
Australia are also included in this part.   
 
3.1.LONG TERM INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS: SURVEY ANALYSIS 
 
As noted above, the NEO as stated in the National Electricity Law identifies five key criteria 
for considering “the long term interests of consumers”:  
i. Price; 
ii. Quality; 
iii. Safety; 
iv. Reliability; and  
v. Security of supply.   
 
A key focus of this report is, what does “the long term interests of consumers” actually 
means.  Are these long term interests adequately reflected in the five criteria currently 
included in the NEO?  To this end, a survey of consumer advocate organisations and other 
market stakeholder organisations was conducted (see Appendix A for a detailed 
methodology, Appendix B for the list of organisations invited to participate in the survey 
and Appendix C for the survey itself).   Participants were asked questions directly related to 
the NEO and the long term interests of consumers, specifically: 
 What are the most important criteria and associated indicators for the long term 
interest of electricity consumers? 
 What criteria for the long term interest of electricity consumers do you think should 
be included in the National Electricity Objective?  
As part of the survey, 13 criteria for the long term interests of electricity consumers, 
including the five already stated in the NEO, were provided as options.   
 
While respondents nearly unanimously agreed that the existing criteria of price, quality, 
safety, reliability and security of supply should be included in the NEO, there was less 
agreement on potential additional criteria as shown in Figure 5 below.  
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Figure 5: Which other criteria should be in the National Electricity Objective?  
 
(Survey Question: “Of the other possible criteria, which should be included in the National Electricity 
Objective?”) 
 
The potential criterion that respondents most strongly agreed should be included was 
‘environmental performance’, with 81% agreeing that it should be included while 15% 
disagreed. ‘Protection of vulnerable consumers’ and ‘energy efficiency’ both had more 
than twice as many respondents call for inclusion than not. ‘Demand management’ also 
attracted a strong degree of agreement from respondents that it should be included (41%) 
versus 26% who disagreed. On balance, respondents disagreed that ‘level of competition’ 
should be included as a criterion and, to a lesser extent, also rejected including ‘customer 
bills’.   
 
Respondents were also asked to rate a series of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) based on 
whether they thought it was important to include them as a measure of the performance 
of the NEM.  The results of these KPI ratings contrast slightly with the results outlined in 6.   
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Figure 6: Top 15 KPIs - Ranking based on average of all survey participants     
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Security Demand management 
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Safety Protection of vulnerable customers 
Price 
Customer bills 
Level of competition 
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Figure 6 shows the 15 highest-ranked KPIs from the survey, colour coded by long term 
interest of consumers criteria.  Included in the top 15 KPIs are: extent of market 
concentration (ranked 3rd), a measurement or KPI relating to the ‘level of competition’ 
criterion; and ‘average annual residential customer’s electricity bill as a proportion of 
household expenditure’ (ranked 6th), which is a measurement of the ‘customer bills’ 
criterion.  This suggests that survey respondents do consider the criteria ‘level of 
competition’ and ‘customer bills’ important as items of long term consumer interest. 
 
Survey respondents also supported having a NEO which included several specific criteria in 
preference to a general NEO without specific criteria by 67% to 11%. Respondents also 
supported a change to the wording of the NEO from ‘the long term interests of consumers 
of electricity’ to ‘the long term interests of the community’, but not by a wide margin. 
 
3.2.OTHER LONG TERM INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS 
 
Social and environmental considerations, as they relate to the national electricity market 
objectives, have at times been included, and at other times excluded, from the official 
policy and the legislative framework of the NEM.  As noted above, social equity and 
environmental considerations were identified as important issues in the energy market 
context by consumer groups and other market stakeholders.  When these responses are 
considered within the broader policy debate and development of the NEM during the past 
two decades, it is clear that in addition to the criteria currently included in the NEO other 
long term interests of electricity consumers, such as environmental and social 
considerations, are of considerable interest and importance. 
 
3.2.1. ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICY DEBATE 
 
Between 1998 and 2004, the need to take account of energy market environmental 
externalities drew comment from important key stakeholders, in particular COAG and the 
MCE.  COAG observed that ‘careful policy design’ was necessary to ensure that ‘fuel choice 
and use are optimised from economic, operational, reliability and security of supply, and 
environmental perspectives.’80  COAG clearly set out the importance of ensuring that 
domestic energy markets were socially responsible and environmentally sustainable: 
 
COAG also recognised that energy markets should operate to maximise 
provision of reliable energy services and that the effective operation of an 
open and competitive energy market contributes to delivering benefits to 
households, small business and industry. ... The challenge for the energy 
sector is to deliver these benefits within a sustainable development 
framework and to meet expectations of social responsibility and 
responsiveness to consumers.81 
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It was further agreed that an important national energy policy objective was to moderate 
greenhouse gas emissions, with COAG stating that the NEO should include the objective of 
minimising both the local and global environmental impacts of energy production, 
transformation, supply and use, in particular greenhouse gas emissions.82 At that time the 
newly established MCE was vested with a responsibility to take account of the 
environmental impact of the energy sector and was required to provide national 
‘leadership so that consideration of broader convergence issues and environmental 
impacts are effectively integrated into energy sector decision-making’.83  In the following 
year, COAG’s independent market review, Towards a Truly National and Efficient Energy 
Market (the Parer Report), identified a number of serious environmental deficiencies in the 
NEM.84 The report found that the various responses to the problem of greenhouse gas 
emissions were ad hoc, uncoordinated, poorly targeted and often competed with rather 
than complemented each other.85 Furthermore, the Parer Report advised that even with 
the vast array of federal and state measures already in place, Australia’s greenhouse gas 
emissions had continued to rise.86  The MCE’s responding report to COAG also emphasised 
the problem of climate change and the need to address greenhouse emissions from the 
energy sector.87 Likewise, the Federal Government’s 2004 Energy White Paper, Securing 
Australia’s Energy Future, and the 2006 update, drew attention to the importance of 
addressing climate change by lowering Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions and meeting 
environmental, as well as economic goals, in energy production and use.88  More recently, 
the Garnaut Review clearly identified the inextricable nature of the relationship between 
energy and the environment. Specifically, the Garnaut Report observed that the economy 
and the environment are closely connected that the latter cannot be externalised from the 
debate and development of the national energy market.89 
 
3.2.2. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE NEO 
 
Despite many views supporting the need to internalise environmental and social 
considerations, the current legislative and regulatory framework of the NEM, and plans for 
its future development, fail to do so. This is illustrated by the changing market objectives – 
set out previously in Table 3 which shows the shift of the NEO away from its initial 
environmentally and socially focused objectives, through its adoption of competition 
principles and the current focus on efficiency.  This legislative turn of events, and the 
implications flowing from the absence of environmental and broader social considerations, 
is at odds with the previous decade of policy debate and other national and state-based 
legislative developments (as discussed in Part 1 and Section 3.2.1). Moreover, broader 
social responsibilities do not feature in the NEO as part of consumers’ long terms interests.   
An explanation for the existence of these perceived deficiencies in the NEO is to consider 
the second reading speech of South Australian Minister for Energy Pat Conlon.90 The 
speech was given during the introduction of the national electricity legislation into 
parliament, and the following extract provides some insight into the legislature’s intention 
regarding the NEO: 
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The market objective is an economic concept and should be interpreted as 
such. For example, investment in and use of electricity services will be 
efficient when services are supplied in the long run at least cost, resources 
including infrastructure are used to deliver the greatest possible benefit and 
there is innovation and investment in response to changes in consumer 
needs and productive opportunities. The long term interest of consumers of 
electricity requires the economic welfare of consumers, over the long term, 
to be maximised. If the National Electricity Market is efficient in an economic 
sense the long term economic interests of consumers in respect of price, 
quality, reliability, safety and security of electricity services will be 
maximised.91 
 
This approach was endorsed by the Expert Panel of Energy Network Pricing, in its 2006 
Report to the MCE. In addition to remarking on ‘an evident trend away from lists of 
independent objectives and towards the inclusion of a single, overarching objective with an 
efficiency focus’92, the Expert Panel expressed the narrow view that ‘the elements of 
productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency, neatly encapsulated in the first paragraph of 
the extract, are at the core of the objective.93 The legislature’s intention to interpret the 
NEO narrowly is further evidenced by subsequent comments of Minister Conlon in his 
second reading speech, made at the time of subsequent amendments in 2007: 
 
It is important to note that the National Electricity Objective does not extend 
to broader social and environmental objectives. The purpose of the National 
Electricity Law is to establish a framework to ensure the efficient operation 
of the National Electricity Market, efficient investment, and the effective 
regulation of electricity networks. As previously noted, the National 
Electricity Objective also guides the Australian Energy Market Commission 
and the Australian Energy Regulator in performing their functions. This 
should be guided by an objective of efficiency that is in the long term 
interest of consumers. Environmental and social objectives are better dealt 
with in other legislative instruments and policies which sit outside the 
National Electricity Law. 94 
 
These speeches raise several points of discussion. First, it is important to note that these 
comments were made at a time when national responsibility for the NEM was restricted to 
the regulation of transmission and distribution of energy services. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that according to these second reading speeches, the NEO was intended to be read 
narrowly, clearly confining the long term interests of consumers to economic interests, in 
particular price, quality, safety, reliability and security.  There is, however, no reason why 
this has to be the case. On the contrary, with the transfer of retail functions to the national 
market institutions, it is perhaps preferable that consumers’ economic interests be read 
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more broadly.  As Brody suggests, if ‘economic’ is understood as ‘relating to the 
production, distribution and use of income and wealth’ then this would permit 
consideration of how ‘wealth or value is distributed among the population’.95  Such 
broader views of economic interests have a close correlation with the wider consumer-
based retail functions currently being vested in the NEM and the functions of the key 
market institutions.  
 
These observations link into the second point of discussion arising out of Minister Conlon’s 
speeches, namely the unrelenting focus on economic interests and the resulting shift in the 
underlying nature of the market objective, as it is understood by key market stakeholders. 
As Cantley-Smith has observed, the national energy market legislative and regulatory 
regime has undergone significant changes in recent years, all of which call for a 
reconsideration of the interpretation of the NEO and the unrelenting focus on competition 
and efficiency.96 Cantley-Smith points out that: 
 
The second reading speeches of Minister Conlon reveal an interesting 
transformation in the asserted nature of the NEO. In the first of these 
speeches, the Minister makes it clear that improved efficiency is the key 
means for ensuring the market objective – the long term interests of 
consumers – is satisfied.  However, by 2007, this has changed, albeit slightly 
but importantly to one where efficiency has become the primary objective 
to, rather than the means of, ensuring the long term interest of consumers. 
This small change in focus is consistent with the goals of economic efficiency 
and competition that have dominated market development throughout the 
past six years.97 
 
The shift in the focus of the NEO increases the importance of ensuring that the means and 
methods of market development do not, incorrectly, assume the role of actual market 
objectives. This potential problem was clearly spelt out in the 1993 Hilmer Report: 
 
Competition policy is not about the pursuit of competition per se. Rather it 
seeks to facilitate effective competition to promote efficiency and economic 
growth while accommodating situations where competition does not 
achieve efficiency or conflicts with other social objectives. These 
accommodations are reflected in the content and breadth of application of 
pro-competitive policies, as well as the sanctioning of anti-competitive 
arrangements on public benefit grounds. 
 
Thirdly, Minister Conlon suggested that ‘environmental and social objectives are better 
dealt with in other legislative instruments and policies which sit outside the National 
Electricity Law’. 98  Developments of this kind are clearly evident at both national and state 
levels, and further explain the absence of social and environmental considerations in the 
NEO. Long term consumer social and environmental interests currently exist in separate 
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and distinct legislative and regulatory schemes, which effectively place such objectives 
outside the immediate realm of the NEM’s legislative and regulatory framework and 
therefore, outside the ambit of responsibility of key market institutions.  For instance, to 
date, matters of social responsibility – for example, hardships facing vulnerable and low 
income users – have been dealt with at a state level, with varying degrees of effectiveness. 
In Victoria for instance, a great deal of effort has gone into providing the necessary safety 
nets for vulnerable and low income electricity consumers.99  To date this has resulted from 
the retention of state responsibility for the retail end of the electricity market.  However, 
with the move towards a full national energy market, and the transfer of retail functions to 
the key national bodies, the various state-based legislative and accountability measures 
have not been transferred into the primary national legislative framework. On the contrary, 
an entirely separate legislative scheme has been created: the National Energy Consumers 
Framework.100  Likewise, at the national level environmental matters affecting energy 
markets exist in entirely separate legislative frameworks, e.g. the National Framework for 
Energy Efficiency and the Energy Efficiency Opportunities Act 2006 (Cth) and regulations101; 
the MRET and more recently the RET102; and the National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (NGER).103 
 
While these developments are, from one perspective, highly commendable, from another 
they represent a fundamental shift in energy market governance, regulation and operation. 
Notably, these legislative schemes have seen the removal of social and environmental 
considerations from the immediate NEM governance, legislative and regulatory 
frameworks.  As such, important energy market externalities are in fact removed from the 
ambit of responsibility of key decision makers and major stakeholders. This disconnect of 
environmental considerations, particularly from the day-to-day operations of the energy 
market, is a significant barrier to ensuring Australia moves to a low carbon future.  
 
The failings of the current NEO, and ultimately the NEM, have received widespread 
comment, which makes it clear that there is an increasing recognition that environmental 
and social considerations have been for too long ignored or excluded from the economic 
debates surrounding the development and operation of the NEM.104 The over-reliance on 
an “economic rationalist” approach to developing and operating the NEM is something that 
demands greater attention and reconsideration. As TEC has pointed out, the ‘economic 
rationalist framework does not free policy designers and decision makers from the 
responsibility of taking the broader context of policy into account’.105 Thus, while the focus 
on competition and efficiency may have been acceptable when the national regulatory 
framework was limited to economic functions, the same cannot be said for the current 
situation. As the national market has expanded to incorporate retail and non-economic 
distribution functions, the need to expand the definition of the NEO to reflect these 
significant changes warrants serious attention and consideration by all stakeholders. 
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3.2.3. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES 
 
In contrast to Australia, several overseas electricity markets currently have embedded 
social and environmental objectives.  Examples of this include the UK, where the principle 
regulator, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) is required to observe the 
following electricity market objective: 
The Authority's principal objective is to protect the interests of existing and future 
consumers in relation to gas conveyed through pipes and electricity conveyed by 
distribution or transmission systems.  The interests of such consumers are their 
interests taken as a whole, including their interests in the reduction of greenhouse 
gases and in the security of the supply of gas and electricity to them.106 
 
Some of these same principles are echoed in US documents written by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission whose mission is ‘reliable, efficient and sustainable energy for 
customers’.107 
 
These themes appear again in Canada where the Canadian National Energy Board, the 
body tasked with regulating energy development in the Canadian public interest has 
defined public interest as: 
Inclusive of all Canadians and refers to a balance of economic, environmental and 
social considerations that changes as society’s values and preferences evolve over 
time.108 
 
Numerous reports and responses within Australia have also called on the NEM to broaden 
its objectives to include social and environmental considerations. Examples of this include 
the following by Lord Mayor of Sydney, Clover Moore: 
The City believes that is the AER’s role to create an energy sector that can 
effectively minimise financial and environmental costs to consumers.109 
 
Other reports have found that NEM market reform to date had not resulted in positive 
climate change outcomes and has mixed equity outcomes.110 Some organisations have 
gone so far as to issue outright declarations that the NEM does not address the 
environmental and social concerns held by the Australian community.111 
 
Based on this research, it is clear that a wide range of organisations and government 
bodies support the inclusion of environmental and social objectives in the management of 
the NEM as well as in international electricity markets.  
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4. NEM REPORT CARD 
 
The National Electricity Market Report Card rates the NEM’s performance with respect to 
12 criteria for the long term interests of consumers.  This section of the report identifies 
the criteria and KPIs included in the Report Card, outlines the Report Card itself, details the 
scoring process for each KPI, and compares the results of the Report Card to results from 
the stakeholder survey. 
 
4.1.CRITERIA AND KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
When choosing the criteria and KPIs for the Report Card it was important to recognise that 
poorly chosen indicators can drive poor and perverse outcomes.  Indeed in simplifying 
concepts into a number or grade, many of the subtleties and interconnectors of real 
situations are missed.  As such, indicators should not be the sole drivers of action, 
particularly within a system as complex as the NEM.  Nevertheless, while performance 
indicators alone do not guarantee effective outcomes, performance is likely to be much 
enhanced if the outcomes are measured and reviewed against well-designed indicators.   
 
To this end, a set of criteria and indicators was developed to provide a transparent, 
comprehensive and accessible snapshot of how the NEM is currently performing.  In so 
doing, we hope to motivate and encourage a greater and more diverse stakeholder 
discussion and input into the development of new and better indicators for the NEM and 
specifically the long term interests of consumers of electricity in Australia.  It should be 
noted that the KPIs chosen are interrelated and as such while one KPI might perform well, 
it may be at the expense of another (see Section 4.5.3 for a short discussion of such 
tensions). 
 
The criteria chosen for the Report Card include the five criteria from the current National 
Electricity Objective and seven potential additional criteria identified by consumer 
advocates and other key stakeholders as important. A detailed account of how and why 
these criteria and KPIs form the basis of this Report Card is given in Appendix A.  The grades 
given in the Report Card are explained in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Report Card Grading Scales Explained 
Grade Performance Level 
A Very Good 
B Good 
C Fair 
D Poor 
F Very Poor 
Ungraded Unable to provide a grade due to inadequate data 
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4.2.REPORT CARD 
The National Electricity Market Report Card – 2011 
*Note: where there is more than one KPI per criterion, the criterion grade is a composite of the KPI grades.    
 CRITERIA GRADE* KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATOR 
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 Reliability B 
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
Reliability Unserved Energy 
Security C Estimated Security Unserved Energy 
Quality Ungraded Customer Severity Index (CSI) 
Safety Ungraded Lost time injury frequency 
Price C 
Retail price of electricity for residential customers 
(c/kWh) 
Retail price of electricity for small business customers 
(c/kWh) 
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Customer bills B 
Average annual residential customers electricity bill as 
a proportion of household expenditure 
Environmental 
performance 
F 
Annual greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity 
sector (tonnes CO2e/year) 
Greenhouse gas intensity of electricity supply (kg 
CO2e/MWh) 
Renewable energy as a proportion of total electricity 
generation  (% of total MWh) 
Energy 
efficiency 
D 
Electricity savings from energy efficiency programs as 
% of total electricity consumed (% of total MWh) 
Demand 
management 
D 
Proportion of peak demand met through demand 
management programs (% of total MW peak) 
Protection of 
vulnerable 
customers 
C 
Number of disconnections of residential customers on 
payment plans and pensions 
Number of households that are 'energy poor'           
(electricity costs > 10% of household budget) 
Customer 
satisfaction 
C 
Number of complaints per year 
Surveyed customer satisfaction 
Level of 
competition 
B 
Extent of generation market concentration 
Extent of retail market concentration 
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4.3.SCORING OF KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
The scoring of each KPI is based on best available NEM data, benchmarked against best 
available international, Australian or NEM data where possible and appropriate.  A detailed 
overview of the scoring methodology is provided in Appendix A Part 5 and Part 6. 
 
4.3.1. RELIABILITY - GRADE B 
4.3.1.1. SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION DURATION INDEX  - GRADE B 
 
KPI: System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
 
AEMO defines reliability in the NEM as a measure of the power system's capacity to 
continue to supply sufficient power to satisfy customer demand, allowing for the loss of 
generation capacity.112  Reliability events are caused by a lack of capacity due to power 
system equipment reaching operational limits and generally occur when reserve capacity in 
the system has been exhausted.113 Further discussion of reliability in the NEM and how it is 
differentiated from security is provided in Section 4.5.2. 
 
One of the most frequently used indicators of distribution network reliability in Australia is 
the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI). SAIDI is the sum (in minutes) of 
the duration of each sustained customer interruption, divided by the total number of 
distribution customers, excluding momentary interruptions of one minute or less 
duration.114 It reflects total outages experienced by distribution customers, including 
outages arising from the generation and transmission sectors. This is important, as from a 
customer’s perspective it is not possible to distinguish between supply interruptions 
caused by distribution, generation or transmission outages. SAIDI data is most often 
normalised to remove “exceptional” events such as the impact of natural disasters.115  
 
All NEM jurisdictions report SAIDI, however care must be taken when comparing cross-
jurisdictional data, as variations exist in the types of network disruptions included, and in 
the network’s geographical conditions and design.116  Noting these caveats, SAIDI data 
indicates electricity networks in the NEM have delivered reasonably stable reliability 
outcomes over the past five years. Across the NEM, a typical customer experiences around 
200 – 250 minutes of outage per year, but significant regional variations often occur owing 
to variables such as the size and regional spread of network and local extreme weather 
events.117 
 
The capital-intensive nature of distribution networks means it is expensive to build the 
higher levels of redundancy required to obtain higher levels of reliability118. In addition, 
distribution outages are often more localised than generation or transmission outages and 
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as such the standards for distribution networks are less stringent than those for generation 
or transmission. Distribution outages are responsible for approximately 90 per cent of the 
duration of all electricity outages in the NEM. The AER defends this outcome stating a 
reliable network keeps electricity outages to efficient levels rather than trying to eliminate 
every possible interruption.119 
 
Historical national benchmarking 
Historical SAIDI data for NEM regions are shown in Table 7 below and graphed in Figure 7. 
 
Table 7: Historical Reliability (SAIDI values) for NEM regions120 121  
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) (minutes) 
Year NSW & 
ACT 
VIC QLD SA TAS NEM Weighted Average 
2005 218 165 283 169 314 211 
2006 191 165 351 199 292 221 
2007 211 197 233 184 256 211 
2008 180 228 264 150 304 213 
2009 211 255 365 161 252 254 
2010 163 170 384 221 454 227 
 
Figure 7: Five-year trend in NEM Reliability (SAIDI)122  
 
  
The trend in NEM reliability is depicted in Figure 7 as.  NEM SAIDI performance over this 
period has been reasonably stable. This data is derived from the AER for the period 2005 to 
2009.  (However, ESAA data was used for 2010, as at the time of writing the AER had not 
yet released data covering 2010.  The upward trend for Queensland and Tasmania between 
2009 and 2010 is likely to be largely due to SAIDI reporting method differences between 
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the 2005-2009 AER data and the ESAA in 2010).  A proposed grading scale for weighted 
NEM SAIDI performance based on its own historical performance is provided in Table 8.  
This historical grading scale was developed by taking the minimum and maximum state 
values for SAIDI between 2005 and 2010 and assigning A and F to these values respectively. 
The intermediate values are spread equally between these maximum and minimum values.  
 
Table 8: NEM SAIDI Historical Grading Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the national historical grading scale shown in Table 8 the NEM scores a B for 
SAIDI in 2010. 
 
International benchmarking 
For the purposes of international benchmarking a breakdown of unsupplied minutes across 
generation, transmission and distribution over a selection of European countries is shown 
below in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Unsupplied minutes per year for selected European Countries123  
Unsupplied Minutes Per Year For Selected European Countries 
Year Austria 
(HV, 
MV) 
Denma
rk (HV, 
MV) 
Germa
ny (HV, 
MV, 
LV) 
Iceland 
(HV, 
MV, 
LV) 
Italy 
(HV, 
MV, 
LV) 
Lithuan
ia (HV, 
MV, 
LV) 
Portug
al (HV, 
MV, 
LV) 
Spain 
(HV, 
MV, 
LV) 
UK  
(HV, 
MV, 
LV) 
2005 31.35 - - 127.18 65.74 92.39 142.82 117 61.04 
2006 48.07 22.20 21.53 106.17 53.84 89.28 152.08 112.8 89.43 
2007 45.50 21.70 - 77.93 52.47 92.21 102.54 103.8 - 
Note: HV = High Voltage, MV = Medium Voltage, LV = Low Voltage 
 
Both the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) and KEMA Consulting stress that 
calculation of SAIDI varies between countries and care must be taken when comparing 
SAIDI figures to ensure the method of calculation is sufficiently similar to allow a valid 
comparison.124  For example, every country has its own methodology for determining what 
constitutes an exceptional event (events excluded from calculation).125  Thus CEER in its 4th 
benchmarking report on the quality of electricity supply presents SAIDI as “minutes lost per 
year” to allow comparison. 
 
An additional consideration when comparing “minutes lost per year” between the NEM 
and European countries is the area covered by the network and the degree of 
Grade SAIDI (minutes) 
A <150 
B 150 – 250 
C 250 – 350 
D 350 – 450 
F >450 
32 
 
interconnection or mesh within the network. The NEM covers a far larger area than 
networks in countries like Italy, Denmark and Austria. Of the countries shown, Spain is the 
closest in size to Australia being approximately 1/15th the land area, however the extent of 
interconnection in the Spanish electricity network is far greater than the NEM. Table 10 
ranks NEM SAIDI performance against selected CEER member countries using 2007 data 
and Table 11 shows a proposed grading scale for comparison of the NEM with CEER 
countries. 
 
Table 10: NEM International Reliability Ranking for 2007126 
NEM SAIDI International Ranking for 2007 
Country Unsupplied Minutes 
Denmark (HV, MV) 21.7 
Austria (HV, MV) 45.5 
Italy (HV, MV, LV) 52.5 
Iceland (HV, MV, LV) 77.9 
Lithuania (HV, MV, LV) 92.2 
Portugal (HV, MV, LV) 102.5 
Spain (HV, MV, LV) 103.8 
Australian NEM 211 
Note: HV = High Voltage, MV = Medium Voltage, LV = Low Voltage 
Table 11: NEM SAIDI International Grading Scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Within top 20% of best performing CEER member Countries with respect 
unsupplied minutes 
B Within top 20-40% of best performing CEER member Countries with 
respect unsupplied minutes 
C Within top 40-60% of best performing CEER member Countries with 
respect unsupplied minutes 
D Within top 60-80% of best performing CEER member Countries with 
respect unsupplied minutes 
F Bottom 20% of OECD of best performing CEER member Countries with 
respect unsupplied minutes 
 
When comparing unsupplied minutes between the NEM and the electricity systems in 
seven European countries, the NEM is ranked last, with the most unsupplied minutes for 
2007.  Based on this result, the NEM scores an F for SAIDI in 2007 based on international 
ranking. However, owing to the geographical differences and the differences in calculation 
of SAIDI between the NEM and CEER countries, preference is given to the NEM national 
historical grading scale.   
 
In the light of the above analysis, the NEM scores a B for overall Reliability in 2010. 
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4.3.1.2. RELIABILITY STANDARD – UNGRADED 
 
KPI: Reliability Unserved Energy 
 
An additional prominent measure used to benchmark reliability in the NEM is Unserved 
Energy (USE) which is a measure of the energy that was not delivered as a result of 
reliability (capacity) related events. Reliability USE is historically assessed against a 
reliability standard and is therefore not conducive to assessment with the grading scale 
used in this report. Instead it is has been included to illustrate how reliability is calculated 
in the NEM and has been assessed using a pass or fail grade only. The grade assigned to 
reliability USE has not been included in the assessment of the final grade assigned for 
reliability in the NEM. 
 
Reported by financial year, USE is the maximum expected amount of energy at risk of not 
being delivered to customers due to a lack of available capacity.127  The AEMC Reliability 
Panel is responsible for setting the reliability standard and stipulates that no more than 
0.002% of customer demand in each NEM region should be unserved (USE) by generation 
capacity in the region, allowing for demand-side capacity and import capacity from 
interconnectors.128 Supply interruptions in transmission and distribution networks that do 
not impact on inter-regional transfer capability are not included in USE. 129   These 
interruptions are subject to different standards and regulatory arrangements.130  As such, 
the Reliability Standard applies to supply interruptions classified as reliability events131 that 
originate in the generation sector and the inter-regional elements of the transmission 
sector.132 Further, reliability USE considers only USE due to the lack of generation or inter-
regional transmission capacity during normal operation of the network within its designed 
security level, i.e. during a single contingency (credible) event, but not during a multiple 
contingency (non-credible) events. Any USE experienced due to a multiple contingency 
event or due to the management of multiple contingency events is classed as a security133 
event.134 From 2005 on, reliability events in the generation and inter-regional transmission 
sectors account for 12 per cent of supply interruptions, with security events135 accounting 
88%.136 
 
The Reliability Standard, USE, is targeted to be achieved every year.  However compliance 
is measured over the most recent ten financial years, as it is not possible to guarantee that 
USE will not exceed 0.002% in any one year. The current Reliability Standard (USE < 
0.002%) equates to interruption of supply to every consumer in a NEM region for 
approximately 10 minutes each year.137 The Reliability Standard is also used as the 
threshold at which AEMO may intervene in the operation of the market to ensure sufficient 
available capacity138 and is the basis for most modeling and setting of various performance 
levels by which the NEM is managed 139. 
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Performance of the NEM against the Reliability Standard for the past 10 years is shown in  
Table 12 below.   
 
The average annual USE over the past 10 years is within the Reliability Standard of 0.002% 
for all regions and for the NEM as a whole, however, insufficient generation capacity to 
meet consumer demand occurred three times from the NEM beginning in 1998 to 30 June 
2010. The most recent instance resulted from a heatwave in Victoria and South Australia in 
January 2009. The USE from these events on an annual basis was 0.0032% for South 
Australia and 0.004% for Victoria140.141  If a similar period of extreme weather were to 
occur again within three years, then it would be possible that Victoria and South Australia 
would experience reserve shortfalls and a heightened risk of supply interruption.142  
 
Table 12: Unserved energy (USE) in the NEM over the past 10 years143  
Year NEM Region NEM Weighted 
Average Per 
Year 
Qld NSW Vic SA Tas 
2008-2009 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0040% 0.0032% 0.0000% 0.0003% 
2007-2008 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
2006-2007 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
2005-2006 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
2004-2005 0.0000% 0.00005
% 
0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
2003-2004 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% - - 
2002-2003 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% - - 
2001-2002 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% - - 
2000-2001 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% - - 
1999-2000 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0004% 0.0019% - - 
10 Year 
Average 
0.00000
% 
0.00000
% 
0.00044
% 
0.00051
% 
0.00000
% 
- 
 
It must be stressed that the Reliability Standard captures only reliability events originating 
in the generation and inter-regional transmission sectors and thus good performance 
against this indicator does not necessarily equate to a high level of supply continuity 
experienced by end-use consumers. An indicator that also encompasses supply 
interruptions originating in the transmission and distribution sectors, such as SAIDI above, 
must also be considered.144 It is worth noting that since 2005 the transmission and 
distribution sectors have been responsible for the majority of supply interruptions145. 
 
A shortfall of the USE indicator is that it does not provide information about the frequency 
of supply interruptions or the impact of any interruption. The difference in actual customer 
experience is not captured by USE e.g. a similar USE value may be obtained for a small 
number of customers being impacted to a very large extent as a large number of customers 
impacted to a small extent.146 
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The AEMC Review of the Effectiveness of NEM Security and Reliability Arrangements in 
light of Extreme Weather Events stated that “implementation of alternative [reliability] 
mechanisms is not needed at this stage” and “there is no evidence to suggest that 
reliability in the NEM has not been achieved with the application of the current Reliability 
Standard and Reliability Settings”.147  A similar conclusion is presented in the AEMC 
Reliability Panel Reliability Standard and Reliability Settings Review with the addition of the 
possibility of considering USE performance against the Reliability Standard (USE<0.002%) 
on an annual basis rather than over a ten year rolling average.148 
 
Additional recommendations from the AEMC relevant to reliability include monitoring the 
performance of the NEM's “energy only” market design to ensure it remains resilient and 
sustainable over time and include this monitoring in the Annual Market Performance 
Review undertaken by the AEMC Reliability Panel.149  This is important as currently NEM 
pays for actual electricity served and not for capacity available.150  
 
As reliability USE is calculated and assessed against the Reliability standard, no greater than 
0.002% of unserved energy, the indicator has been graded in this report in terms of pass or 
fail. The weighted NEM average reliability USE in 2008/09 was 0.0003%, which is lower 
than the reliability standard of 0.002% and thus the NEM receives a pass grade for 
reliability USE in 2008/09. 
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4.3.2. SECURITY OF SUPPLY – GRADE C  
 
KPI: Estimated Security Unserved Energy 
 
AEMO defines security of supply in the NEM as a measure of the power system's capacity 
to continue operating within defined technical limits even in the event of the disconnection 
of a major power system element such as an interconnector or large generator.151  Security 
events are generally those caused by a rapid disconnection of power system equipment 
from service due to either equipment failure or the activation of protection systems.152 
Security is the product of the technical performance characteristics of plant and equipment 
connected to the power system and how AEMO and network service providers operate 
it.153  Section 4.5.2 details further discussion on security and how it is differentiated from 
reliability in the NEM.  
 
AEMO is responsible for maintaining the security of the NEM154 and is charged with 
operating the power system within the limits of the technical envelope.155  Much of the 
data used by AEMO to ascertain if the NEM is operating in a secure fashion is not publically 
reported and there is currently no reported overall system wide measure for security of 
supply. The situation is further constrained by the National Electricity Rules (NER)156 
defining the power system (NEM) as operating in a secure state if the AEMO, in its 
“reasonable opinion”, considers it is secure. Security related data currently reported for the 
NEM on a recurring basis includes: 
 
 frequency and voltage performance 
 power system directions issued by AEMO  
 major power system incidents and contingency events 
 actual and forecast minimum reserve levels 
 maximum demand forecasts and transmission outages 
 accuracy of AEMO forecasts (medium term, short term and pre-dispatch) 
 reliability measures (SAIDI, SAIFI and CAIDI) 
 
The above data do not provide a system-wide measure of NEM security and no such 
system wide measure is regularly reported. Security is an important criterion for NEM 
customers and regular (at least annual) reporting and publication of a NEM wide security 
indicator, detailing the NEMs current and historical performance is recommended to aid 
transparency  and performance management in NEM security.  
 
In its 2010 Review of the Effectiveness of NEM Security and Reliability Arrangements in 
light of Extreme Weather Events, the AEMC reported a differentiated version of the NEM 
reliability indicator, Unserved Energy (USE), which provides an estimate of the USE caused 
by security related supply interruptions in the generation and transmission sectors (See 
section 4.3.1 for a detailed description of reliability USE).  
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It is understood this estimated security USE is an imperfect measure of system wide 
security as it relates to generation and inter-regional transmission capacity only, however it 
is currently the largest scope, security specific metric that is reported publically. 
 
It must be stressed that as the estimated security USE captures only security events 
originating in the generation and inter-regional transmission sectors and that good 
performance against this indicator does not necessarily equate to a high level of security of 
supply experienced by end-use consumers. An indicator that also encompasses security 
related supply interruptions originating in the transmission and distribution sectors must 
also be considered. 
 
In addition, a shortfall of the estimated security USE indicator is that it does not provide 
information on how often supply is interrupted or the impact of any interruption. The 
difference in actual customer experience is not captured by USE. For example, a similar USE 
value may be obtained for two events, when one of them has a large impact on each of a 
small number of customers and the other has a small impact on each of a large number of 
customers.157 NEM performance against the estimated Security related USE is presented in 
Figure 8 for the period, 2005 –2009. 
 
Figure 8: Security related UnServed Energy (USE) in the NEM 2005 - 2009158 
 
 
 
Owing to an incomplete estimated security USE dataset for 2010, the security of supply 
USE indicator has been graded using the last full year of data (2009).  To aid with grading, a 
comparison between the (estimated) security of supply USE indicator, and reliability USE 
(used by the AEMO to measure reliability in the NEM see section 4.3.1) is shown in Table 
13. In 2009 it can be seen the (estimated) security USE far exceeds reliability USE, showing 
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NEM security events are responsible for a far larger proportion of generation and inter-
regional transmission supply interruptions than reliability events. 
 
Table 13 Comparison of (estimated) security USE and reliability USE 2005-2009159 
Year Estimated 
Security USE 
NEM 
Electricity 
Consumption 
Estimated 
Security USE     
as % of NEM 
consumption 
Reliability 
USE               
as % of NEM 
consumption 
Units (MWh/yr) (GWh/yr) (%) (%) 
2005 919 202,800 0.0005 0.0000 
2006 781 206,400 0.0004 0.0000 
2007 8050 208,000 0.0039 0.0000 
2008 343 207,900 0.0002 0.0000 
2009 6431 206,000 0.0031 0.0003 
 
The comparison in Table 13 is useful in eliciting the types of events responsible for 
generation and transmission outages. However it must be remembered the two indicators 
are controlled by different planning and operation mechanisms and are likely to lie at 
differing levels in an economically efficient NEM.  
 
The (estimated) security USE is graded based on the grading scale shown in Table 14 that 
benchmarks (estimated) security USE against it historical performance. The lowest 
(estimated) security USE in the period was awarded a B and the highest a D. This narrowed 
grading band, with B the best grade and D the worst was utilised owing to the small size 
and low quality dataset available for (estimated) security USE.  
 
Table 14 Security Unsupplied Energy grading scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the grading scale in Table 14 the NEM scores a C for security of supply in 2009. 
 
However, It is stressed that current reporting of NEM security of supply is insufficient and 
further work is required. Greater transparency and clarity of reporting is recommended 
including details of indicator calculation and annual public reporting of a specific overall 
(including the distribution sector) measure of security of supply. 
 
 
Grade (Estimated) Security Unsupplied Energy 
(MWh/yr) 
B <350 
C 350 - 8050 
D >8050 
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4.3.3. QUALITY OF SUPPLY – UNGRADED 
 
KPI: Customer Severity Index (CSI) 
 
In the stakeholder survey, the quality KPI options were not rated highly by respondents. 
Some survey respondents commented that many customers, particularly residential ones, 
were unlikely to be aware of whether they are experiencing quality of supply issues, until 
one or more of their electrical appliances failed. While verified customer quality of supply 
complaints do provide an indication of more pronounced or protracted quality of supply 
issues, they do not offer the most efficient or comprehensive method for reporting their 
occurrence. A more direct and comprehensive indicator for the quality of supply is 
presented here for the purposes of the Report Card. 
 
Quality of supply relates to the characteristics of the electricity supply delivered to end 
customers. Poor quality electricity can be likened to a water supply that has low pressure 
or does not meet water purity standards.160 Poor quality electricity supply may also inhibit 
the normal operation of electrical equipment or damage it. The overall quality of electricity 
supply depends on a number of factors, including the location of your connection to the 
electricity network, the load type(s) of the surrounding electricity users and the voltage 
level at which you are connected to the network. As a general rule, the quality of supply is 
improved by connecting to the network at higher voltage levels and by connecting to 
networks with lower network exposures.161 
 
The factors that affect the quality of electricity supply for an end user include162:  
 steady state voltage  
 supply frequency  
 voltage sags 
 voltage swells  
 voltage transients 
 current issues  
 harmonic distortions 
 radio frequency interference.  
 
It is important to note supply quality issues like voltage “sag” or “swell” may not interrupt 
the supply of electricity, but for a business customer operating voltage sensitive machines, 
a sustained partial loss of voltage or voltage sag can cause the same amount of downtime 
as a complete one hour loss of power.163 For this reason Electricity Network Service 
Providers must observe state, territory and national codes, licences and statutes that 
specifically detail the required performance and nature of electricity supply networks.164 
 
Quality of supply and security of supply are related to each other, as a secure network 
operates within the technical limits prescribed by the AEMO (see section 0) and many of 
these prescribed technical limits are also measures of the quality of supply. Currently 
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reported measures relating to the quality of electricity supply in the NEM that are publicly 
reported113 and for which data is provided include: 
 
 frequency – the number of times the frequency moved outside the normal 
operating band during the fiscal year and the duration of the excursion. 
 frequency – the daily standard deviation of frequency on the NEM 
 power systems directions – number of power systems directions issued during the 
year (these directions are a power system security safety net mechanisms available 
to AEMO to issue directions to maintain the power system operating security) 
 power system events – number and description of power system events. 
 
As the above data reported by the AEMC Reliability Panel does not include a NEM-wide 
overview of quality of supply, or sufficient data to calculate a KPI for this purpose, quality 
of supply has not been graded. However, a NEM-wide quality of supply indicator has been 
developed which has potential to highlight key power quality issues in electricity networks. 
Developed by the University of Wollongong (UOW) and Energy Networks Australia (ENA), 
through the Australian Long Term National Power Quality Survey (LTNPQS), the Customer 
Severity Index (CSI) shows great promise for use in NEM quality of supply reporting. The 
LTNPQS is a large multi-utility power quality survey that has been in operation for the past 
8 years.165 The LTNPQS provides, among other measures, an overall power quality (PQ) 
performance indicator, CSI, which can be used to measure utility network performance 
based on the total impact on a customer due to a combination of four disturbances. The 
PQ disturbances analysed are steady state voltage, voltage balance, voltage total harmonic 
distortion (THD) and voltage sag. The UOW considers these voltage disturbances as the key 
indicators of power quality for Australia at present.166 The 2008–2009 LTNPQS reports 
contained data from 540 distinct sites provided by 10 of the 14 electricity distributors 
across all Australian states. In terms of number of sites, geographic extent and longevity, it 
is one of the largest power quality monitoring projects in the world.167 
 
At least some of the networks already report quality of supply data produced through the 
LTNPQS. Ausgrid, for example, currently provide data from 37 sites in their network to the 
LTNPQS and use the results to provide them with network management information.168 
Utility averages can be used to generate year-by-year trends alerting network operators if 
disturbance levels are increasing and it is apparent that limits may soon be exceeded.169 
 
It is beyond the scope of this report to ascertain which NEM networks currently utilise 
LTNPQS data and report on quality of supply. However it appears that the development 
and public reporting of NEM regional CSI data and NEM-wide CSI data could allow NEM-
wide benchmarking, trend analysis and ultimately a system-wide KPI for measuring the 
quality of electricity supplied to NEM customers. 
 
For the reasons outlined above, the level of NEM performance for supply quality remains 
Ungraded in this Report Card.    
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4.3.4. SAFETY – UNGRADED  
 
KPI: Lost time injury frequency 
 
It is to be expected that safety is one of the criteria for the long term interests of 
consumers within the National Electricity Objective.  It is essential that Australia’s 
electricity system is as safe as possible for both the public at large and those who work 
within the National Electricity Market.   
 
Unlike many of the other criteria and associated KPIs in this Report Card which are an 
outcome of the interaction of behaviour of numerous market participants, primary 
responsibility for safety lies squarely with the individual businesses within the NEM such as 
generators and distributors, rather than a NEM coordination body such as AEMO, AEMC or 
AER.  This locates the responsibility for safety in the organisations where a culture of safety 
is most required.  Consequently, most public reporting on safety indicators is undertaken in 
company annual reports.   
 
Figure 9:  Serious electrical network accidents (NSW, 2005 – 2010)170 
 
 
 
A consequence of safety reporting occurring at a company level is that finding consistent 
aggregated NEM-wide safety data for the purposes of this Report Card has been difficult.  
Statutory safety reporting requirements operate at a state level and thus differ from state 
to state across the NEM.  NSW requires the most comprehensive electricity safety 
reporting of all states.  This is done through the NSW Department of Industry and 
Investment’s Electricity Network Business Safety Reporting Template.171  Based on this 
data, Figure 9 shows a generally declining trend over the past five years in the combined 
number of serious electrical network accidents from the four NSW Network businesses 
now called Transgrid, Essential Energy (formerly Country Energy), Ausgrid (formerly Energy 
Australia) and Endeavour Energy (formerly Integral Energy).  This data is from only one 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
se
ri
o
u
s 
e
le
ct
ri
ca
l a
cc
id
e
n
ts
 
(f
at
al
 a
n
d
 n
o
n
-f
at
al
, p
u
b
lic
, n
e
tw
o
rk
 
w
o
rk
e
r,
 c
o
n
tr
ac
to
rs
 a
n
d
 A
SP
)
Year
42 
 
sector of the NEM in one state and is thus insufficient to rate the safety performance of the 
NEM. Therefore other sources of safety data have been sought to use in this Report Card. 
However, a similar level of detailed information for electricity network safety has not been 
found in other NEM states or for other parts of the NEM, such as the generation sector.   
 
The most comprehensive aggregated public reporting of safety indicators found is 
published by the Energy Supply Association of Australia (ESAA).  In the last six Electricity 
Gas Australia reports, ESAA has reported lost time injury frequency – the number of injuries 
per million hours worked for the transmission and distribution and generation sectors. 
Additionally, either days lost due to injury (days lost per employee) or the lost time injury 
severity rate (days lost per million hours worked) has also been reported for both sectors.  
These are also the safety KPIs that most electricity companies report on in their annual 
reports.  For the purposes of this report lost time injury frequency has been taken as the 
key safety performance indicator.   
 
Figure 10 and Figure 11 provide state-by-state data of lost time injury frequency.  Because 
the time period covered is so short and the data show a high degree of variability, there is 
no clear trend evident.   
 
 
Figure 10: NEM generation sector lost time injury frequency 2004/05-2009/10172  
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Figure 11: NEM transmission and distribution lost time injury frequency (2004-2010)173 
 
 
*Please note:  As data on hours worked in the electricity generation, transmission and distribution sectors is 
not publicly available, to generate a NEM weighted average for lost time injury frequency, the jurisdictional 
figures were averaged using ESAA jurisdictional customer numbers data.   As customer numbers are far from 
an ideal proxy for hours worked, it is recommended that in future, data on either total hours worked or a 
NEM weighted average of lost time injury frequency be reported. 
 
It should also be noted that as of 2009/10, ESAA has started to report an Australian 
weighted average only and not state-by-state data.  The Australian weighted average 
includes data from both the non-NEM jurisdictions of the Northern Territory and Western 
Australia.  This means that in the future, it will be more difficult to monitor both NEM-wide 
and jurisdictional lost time injury frequency performance. 
 
As discussed in Appendix A, the preferred approach to scoring KPIs in this Report Card is to 
benchmark against international data.  However, after extensive desktop research, neither 
comparable international electricity benchmark data nor Australian performance standards 
for lost time injury frequency were found.  Given that no issue is taken more seriously in 
the industry than safety, the absence of reliable international benchmarks and the 
difficulty of comparing safety data across different jurisdictions, it is considered 
inappropriate to provide a grade to the lost time injury frequency KPI and thus to safety 
criteria.  Sound national and/or international benchmarks for the safety performance of 
the NEM should be developed as a matter of priority.  
 
Therefore, the level of NEM performance for safety remains Ungraded in this Report Card.   
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4.3.5. PRICE – GRADE C  
 
Across Australia, there has been significant recent media interest in the price of electricity, 
particularly for residential consumers.  It is thus unsurprising that two price indicators were 
considered by survey respondents to be important indicators for inclusion in this Report 
Card and the NEO more generally.  However, as discussed in Section 4.5.3, using price as an 
indicator can have drawbacks and lead to perverse outcomes.   
 
Price performance of the NEM is covered by four KPIs in this report. These different time 
periods pick up different trends both in the NEM and internationally.  Three of the price 
KPIs are variations of residential retail price over different time periods, but do not cover 
the significant price increases in 2010–11.  The KPIs and grades assigned are shown below. 
 
Table 15: Price performance indicators 
KPI Grade 
Retail price of electricity for residential customers 1990–2010 A 
Retail price of electricity for residential customers 2010 B 
Retail price of electricity for residential customers 2009–2010 D 
Retail price of electricity for small business customers 2009-2011 D 
 
Determining the weighting between these four categories is both contentious and 
ultimately subjective. After internal discussions and conversations with key stakeholders, it 
was decided that each KPI should be weighted equally for the purposes of this report. 
Therefore, based on the results in Table 15, the NEM receives a C for electricity prices. 
 
4.3.5.1. RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY PRICE – GRADE B 
 
KPI: Retail price of electricity for residential customers (c/kWh) 
 
Australia has historically had low electricity prices by international standards, based in 
large part on the availability of large reserves of black and brown coal.174  The price of 
electricity is already a key indicator within the NEM and most if not all other electricity 
markets worldwide; as such it is already included as a criterion in the NEO.  Electricity 
prices have been pivotal to electricity market reform and specifically the formation of the 
NEM.  The central feature of the NEM is a wholesale spot market, where electricity is 
traded at 5-minute intervals. As such, there is a huge quantity of data available for the 
wholesale price of electricity; however, as the market moves towards full retail 
contestability and away from state-based regulated retail tariffs, less and less is known 
about the retail cost of electricity.  For example, since 2004 Australia has not reported 
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industry and household price data to the International Energy Agency (IEA), making it hard 
to consistently compare retail price information internationally.   
 
Figure 12:  NEM average residential retail electricity price by component 2010–11175  
 
 
In 2010/11, the average retail electricity tariff in the NEM for residential customers was 
21.38c/kWh, up 14% from 18.81c/kWh in 2009/10.176  Figure 12 shows the breakdown of 
this price by components, indicating that wholesale and distribution costs contribute the 
most to residential customers’ electricity tariffs.177  Electricity prices are approaching levels 
not seen for 50 years (see Figure 13), with price rises of between 20% and 39% across the 
NEM all but locked in from 2009/10 to 2012/13.178  In this Report Card, NEM residential 
electricity prices are compared to OECD residential electricity price performance over three 
time periods: 
 
 From 1990 to 2010, representing the change in electricity prices from prior to any 
significant reforms in the Australian electricity system, to the most recent year with 
available international data; 
 Annual change, from 2009–2010, which is the most recent two year period with 
available international data; and 
 A 2010 electricity price snapshot. 
 
These three measures, which equate to three individual KPIs, have been included to draw a 
comprehensive picture of what is occurring with NEM electricity prices and how they 
compare internationally.  However, as discussed, the primary KPI considered in this report 
is the 20-year time frame of 1990 to 2010.  
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Figure 13: Actual and forecast residential electricity price in NEM states (1955-2013)179   
 
 
NEM residential electricity prices 1990-2010 
Since 1990, residential retail electricity prices in the NEM have increased in real terms from 
an average of 15.3c/kWh180 to 18.81c/kWh181 in 2009/10.  This represents an average 
increase of 3.51c/kWh.   Internationally, for change in residential retail electricity prices 
between 1990 and 2010, Australia ranks 4th of the 29 OECD countries for which residential 
electricity price data are available (Figure 14).   
 
Figure 14: Change in residential retail price of electricity (OECD countries’ 1990–2010)182  
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Based on this international comparison, the grading scale is shown below in Table 16.  
However, it should be noted that as with any comparison of complex systems in different 
contexts, caution must be applied.  This is particularly important as different countries 
treat externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions in different ways. For example, the EU 
countries in this comparison have seen significant electricity prices rises with the 
introduction of the EU ETS in 2005.183  
Table 16: Change in residential electricity prices grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Top 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in residential electricity 
prices 1990–2010 
B In the 60–80% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
residential electricity prices 1990–2010 
C In the 40–60% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
residential electricity prices 1990–2010 
D In the 20–40% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
residential electricity prices 1990–2010 
F Bottom 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in residential 
electricity prices 1990–2010 
 
When a long-term view is taken, the NEM ranks 4th out of 29, with a change in the cost of 
electricity for residences in the NEM of 2.9cUS/kWh (purchasing power standard).  Based 
on this result, the NEM receives an A for Residential Electricity Price. 
 
2010 NEM residential electricity prices 
Comparing the current cost of electricity in the NEM to other OECD countries (Figure 15) is 
also useful, given the current concern about electricity price rises.  Based on this 
comparison, in 2009–10 Australia ranked 8th of the 32 OECD countries for which there is 
residential electricity price data available.  The best performing OECD country is Norway, 
where a kilowatt hour of electricity costs 9.9cUS (purchasing power standard); while 
Hungary has the most expensive electricity at 30.8cUS/kWh (purchasing power standard).   
Based on this international comparison, the grading scale is shown below in Table 17. 
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Figure 15: Residential retail price of electricity (OECD countries’ 2010)184  
 
 
Table 17: Residential electricity prices grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Top 20% of OECD Countries with respect to residential electricity price in 2010 
B In the 60–80% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to residential electricity 
price in 2010 
C In the 40–60% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to residential electricity 
price in 2010 
D In the 20–40% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to residential electricity 
price in 2010 
F Bottom 20% of OECD Countries with respect to residential electricity price in 
2010 
 
The NEM ranks 8th out of 32 with a cost of residential electricity in the NEM of 
13.2cUS/kWh (purchasing power standard).  Based on this result, the NEM receives a B for 
Residential Electricity Price. 
 
NEM residential electricity prices 2009–2010 
Given that residential electricity prices have been rising significantly in the past few years 
and that they are projected to keep rising until at least 2015, obtaining data on the most 
recent annual increase in electricity prices was considered important.   
Figure 16 indicates that NEM residential electricity prices have risen by 0.9cUS/kWh, which 
is the 9th highest electricity price rise in the OECD from 2009 to 2010.  Based on this 
international comparison, the grading scale is shown below in Table 18. 
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Figure 16: Annual change in residential retail cost of electricity (OECD 2009–2010)185  
 
 
Table 18: Annual change in residential electricity prices grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Top 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in residential electricity 
prices 2009–2010 
B In the 60–80% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
residential electricity prices 2009–2010 
C In the 40–60% bracket of OECD countries with respect to the change in 
residential electricity prices 2009–2010 
D In the 20–40% bracket of OECD countries with respect to the change in 
residential electricity prices 2009–2010 
F Bottom 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in residential 
electricity prices 2009–2010 
 
For annual change in electricity prices 2009–10, Australia ranks 24th of the 32 OECD 
countries for which data is available.  Based on this result, the NEM receives a D for 
Residential Electricity Price.   
 
However, it should be noted that the period considered does not cover the most recent 
electricity price rises in 2011.  Three grades for residential electricity prices have been 
given; these are combined with the grade given to the Small Business Retail Price KPI to 
provide an overall grade for NEM Electricity Prices.  What these three indicators illustrate is 
that while absolute NEM residential electricity prices and the price change over a 20-year 
period compare positively with international experience, prices are currently rising at a 
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quicker rate than in most OECD countries.  Given that electricity prices are on an upward 
trajectory in the NEM and the Australian dollar is currently strong, it is likely that the NEM 
will receive a lower grade in all residential price KPIs in the upcoming years.   
 
4.3.5.2. SMALL BUSINESS RETAIL PRICE – GRADE D 
 
KPI: Retail price of electricity for small business customers (c/kWh) 
 
In the NEM, Australia-wide and internationally there is a wide range of metrics reported for 
non-residential electricity prices. The main ones are business, industrial, commercial and 
small business prices.  The main challenge for this KPI has been to find data for a consistent 
metric against which to benchmark.   
 
Figure 17: All business electricity price in NEM states 1969–70 to 2009–10186   
 
 
Figure 17 provides a time series of business (combined commercial and industrial) prices in 
NEM states.  It indicates that from 1969–70 business electricity prices declined in real 
terms until 2008–09 when the NEM weighted average cost of electricity for businesses was 
10.02c/kWh187.  This decline was particularly marked between 1990 and 2009, when 
compared to international industrial prices 188 over the same period, Australia was placed 
first of the 20 OECD countries for which there are data (Figure 18).  Based on this 
international comparison, the grading scale is shown below in Table 19. 
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Figure 18: OECD countries’ change in the electricity prices for industry 1990-2010189 
 
Table 19: Change in industry electricity prices grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Top 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in industry electricity 
prices 1990–2010 
B In the 60–80% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in industry 
electricity prices 1990–2010 
C In the 40–60% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in industry 
electricity prices 1990–2010 
D In the 20–40% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in industry 
electricity prices 1990–2010 
F Bottom 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in industry electricity 
prices 1990–2010 
 
Based on this result, the NEM would receive an A for Business Electricity Prices.  However, 
neither business nor industry electricity prices discussed above are small business 
electricity prices.  While it is recognised that large businesses are an important part of the 
NEM, only one of the five large business consumer groups invited to participate in the 
stakeholder survey responded.  Further, the price of electricity for large business 
customers was not rated highly as an indicator by survey participants across the board.  As 
such, while Figure 17 and Figure 18 do give an indication of the performance of large 
business electricity prices, the focus of this KPI is small business energy prices.   
 
52 
 
Figure 19: Small business standing offer electricity prices in NEM 2008–09 to 2011–12190 
 
 
Both internationally and in Australia there is very little reporting of small business 
electricity prices.  Nevertheless, over the past four years the Office of the Tasmanian 
Economic Regulator (OTTER) has published small-business standing offer electricity prices 
for every state and territory in Australia.  Their figures are based on combined unit and 
standing charges for businesses who consume up to 160MWh/year191.  These state figures, 
as well as a NEM weighted average192 are shown in Table 20. It should be noted that 
standing offers are generally the most expensive offers made, so it is likely that many small 
businesses will be paying below the prices shown in Figure 19 and Table 20.  
  
 
Table 20: NEM small business electricity price and comparative increases193  
 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
NEM Small Business Electricity Price 
(c/kWh) 
17.95 20.90 24.03 28.00 
Percentage increase  16% 15% 17% 
Producer Price Index (PPI)  increase  -0.1% 2.8%  
Consumer Price Index (CPI) increase  2.3% 2.7%  
 
To give a grade to these figures, the annual percentage change in price was compared to 
Producer Price Index, as shown in Table 20.  As this is not based on an international 
comparison the grading scale has simpler B–D range as shown below in Table 21. 
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Table 21: NEM small business electricity price grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
B NEM weighted average small business electricity price declined  
C 
NEM weighted average small business electricity price stayed steady or increased 
by less than PPI increase from 2009–10 to 2010–11  
D 
NEM weighted average small business electricity price increased by more than 
PPI increase from 2009–10 to 2010–11 
 
The standing offer electricity price for small businesses serviced by the NEM rose by an 
average of 15% between 2009–10 and 2010–11.  Based on this result, the NEM receives a D 
for Small Business Electricity Prices.  This reflects the fact that small business prices are 
significantly higher than for large industry or aggregated business prices and even higher 
than current residential prices in the NEM.  This could be explained by the fact that small 
businesses tend to use electricity at times of peak demand.  They also face significantly 
higher network tariffs than larger firms that take their supply at higher voltages. A more 
detailed discussion of electricity prices and bills is given in Section 4.5.3. 
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4.3.6. CUSTOMER BILLS – GRADE A  
 
KPI: Average annual residential customers’ electricity bill as a proportion of household 
expenditure 
 
Electricity bills as a proportion of household income was identified by survey respondents 
as the most important customer bills criterion.  However, during the course of this 
research, more robust household expenditure data has been identified, particularly for the 
purposes of international benchmarking.  As such, this KPI has been modified slightly to 
look at residential electricity bills as a proportion of household expenditure rather than 
income, although it should be noted that both are discussed below.    
 
These KPIs takes three factors into account at a NEM average level: 
 residential retail cost of electricity 
 how much electricity households are consuming 
 total household expenditure or total household income. 
 
According to the 2009–10 ABS survey of household expenditure, electricity bills currently 
account for an average of 1.48% of household income, slightly down from 1.53% in 2003–
04 (Table 22).  (Of all the NEM states, only NSW electricity bills as a proportion of 
household income went up over this period.)  Overall this indicates that the electricity bills 
(cost of electricity and household electricity consumption) over this period have been rising 
more slowly than income levels.  It should be noted however, that this data does not 
include the two electricity price rises in July 2010 and July 2011 and it is likely that 
electricity prices are now rising at a greater rate than income, and while AEMO194 (see 
Figure 20) has reported a plateauing or slight decrease in energy consumption this is 
unlikely to be at a sufficient rate to offset the rising cost of electricity.  Thus, if a more 
recent survey was undertaken it is likely that electricity bills as a proportion of household 
income would have increased on 2009–10 levels above 2003–04 levels. 
 
Figure 20: NEM-wide electricity consumption 2005–06 to 2010–11195  
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In the period discussed above (2003–04 to 2009–10) electricity bills as a proportion of 
household expenditure, rose slightly on average across the NEM from 1.9% to 2.0%. 
However, this increase is mainly due to an increase in NSW from 1.7% to 2.0%.  In all other 
states and territories in the NEM, electricity as a proportion of household expenditure 
either stayed constant or declined as shown in Table 22. 
 
Table 22: NEM states’ average electricity bills as a proportion of household Income196  
 
Electricity Bills as a Proportion 
of Household Income 
Electricity Bills as a Proportion 
of Household Expenditure 
  2003/04 2009/10 2003/04 2009/10 
NSW 1.36% 1.49% 1.75% 2.04% 
Vic 1.46% 1.36% 1.85% 1.81% 
Qld 1.55% 1.47% 1.94% 1.93% 
SA 2.03% 1.68% 2.56% 2.40% 
Tas 2.68% 2.37% 3.17% 2.91% 
ACT 1.43% 1.12% 1.88% 1.70% 
NEM Weighted 
Average 
1.53% 1.48% 1.93% 2.00% 
 
Figure 21 compares the NEM to the most recently available international data for European 
OECD countries.197  Based on this comparison, Australia has the 7th lowest electricity bills as 
a proportion of household income of 23 countries.  However, it should be noted that the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme was introduced in 2005, which would affect the comparison 
and location of Australia within this ranking.  Nevertheless, as data could not be sourced 
for the whole OECD, the European data has been used as a benchmark for this KPI, the 
grading scale for which is shown below in Table 23. 
 
Figure 21: Electricity bills as a proportion of household income (NEM vs Europe)198  
 
*Note, NEM data is for 2009/10, while the European data is for 2005.  
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Table 23: NEM electricity bills as a proportion of household income grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Top 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in industry electricity 
prices 1990–2009 
B In the 60–80% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
industry electricity prices 1990–2009 
C In the 40–60% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
industry electricity prices 1990–2009 
D In the 20–40% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
industry electricity prices 1990–2009 
F Bottom 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in industry 
electricity prices 1990–2009 
 
Based on this result, the NEM receives a B for electricity bills as a proportion of household 
expenditure.   
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4.3.7. ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE – GRADE F 
 
Environmental performance was chosen by survey respondents as the most important new 
criterion to include in the NEO. It was also selected as the criterion in which the NEM is 
performing the most poorly. Furthermore, as discussed in more depth in Section 3.2.2 of 
this report, environmental criteria have previously been included in Australian electricity 
market objectives. 
 
Environmental performance of the NEM is covered by three KPIs in this report. The KPIs 
and grades assigned are shown below in Table 24. 
 
Table 24: Environmental performance indicators 
KPI Grade 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions F 
Greenhouse Gas Intensity F 
Renewable Energy D 
 
Determining the weighting between these three categories is both contentious and 
ultimately a matter of judgement. After internal discussions and conversations with key 
stakeholders, it was decided that each KPI should be weighted equally for the purposes of 
this report. It should be noted however an alternative weighting would probably not result 
in a different overall score.  
 
Therefore, based on the results in Table 24, the NEM receives an F for environmental 
performance. 
 
4.3.7.1. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS – GRADE F 
 
KPI: Annual greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector (tonnes CO2-e/year) 
 
The majority of survey respondents agreed that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are an 
important indicator of the long term interests of consumers. This line of thought has been 
stated internationally in recent forums such as by the UK Parliament: 
 
The interests of gas and electricity consumers are their interests taken as a whole, 
including their interests in the reduction of greenhouse gases ...199 
 
The written responses in the survey were also dominated by calls for the inclusion of 
sustainability criteria in the evaluation of the NEM with 25% of respondents who suggested 
alternative criteria directly mentioning GHGs and 83% mentioning sustainability.200  
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As recently as 2006, the official position of the federal government was that along with the 
objective of promoting the long term interests of consumers, it was important to ‘address 
greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector’.201 
 
GHG emissions from electricity generation in the NEM have continued to increase each 
year from 118.1 Mt in 1990 to 187.3 Mt in 2009 at an average rate of 2.4% per annum.202 
As of 2009, the emissions in the NEM comprised 45% of the emissions from energy and 
31% of the total emissions in Australia203 making it the largest source of GHG emissions in 
Australia.  Emissions growth by state is shown in Figure 22 below. 
 
Figure 22: Greenhouse Gas emissions in the NEM204  
 
 
 
The Commonwealth government has committed to a 5% reduction205 in national GHG 
emissions by 2020 from 2000 levels206 and this has been used as the proxy baseline target 
for the GHG emissions from electricity generation in the NEM KPI207 as shown in Figure 23. 
This target would require an average annual reduction of 0.24% and would reduce 
emissions from 160.6 Mt in 2000 to 152.6 Mt in 2020. This approach to this KPI was taken 
due to a lack of targets specific to the electricity industry as the current Australian policy 
framework rejects the idea of industry-specific targets.  However, it is noteworthy that 
electricity sector specific emissions target have applied in NSW since 1997 through the 
NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme and its predecessor benchmarks scheme.  The 
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GHG target used in this report provides a proxy benchmark against which to grade 
performance and is not being suggested as official government policy. As the electricity 
industry makes up such a large proportion of Australian emissions, emissions from this area 
will need to be reduced if Australia’s domestic emissions are to be significantly reduced. 
Note the 5% reduction from 2000 level target (green dotted line) has been back cast from 
2000 to 1990 to provide a longer time series over which trend may be more clearly 
identified. 
 
Figure 23: NEM Greenhouse gas emissions compared to Australian target 
 
 
Looking at this from the perspective of the NEM, emissions could be allowed to grow under 
this target from 118.1 Mt in 1990 at a rate of 0.82% per annum until 2020.208 However, 
emissions from the NEM have actually increased at a rate of 2.28% per annum. Based on 
this, the grading scale is shown below in Table 25. 
 
Table 25: GHG emissions grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Emission growth trajectory significantly lower than 2020 target trajectory 
B Emission growth trajectory  meets or lower than 2020 target trajectory  
C Emission growth trajectory  above 2020 target trajectory but within 50% 
D Emission growth trajectory 50% to 100% above 2020 target trajectory  
F Emission growth trajectory more than twice 2020 target trajectory 
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Emissions grew from 118.1Mt in 1990 to 187.3Mt in 2009, 2.7 times the rate required to 
meet the Commonwealth target of 152.6 Mt CO2e by 2020. Based on this result, the NEM 
receives an F for GHG emissions. 
 
4.3.7.2. GREENHOUSE GAS INTENSITY – GRADE F 
 
KPI: Greenhouse gas intensity of electricity supply (kg CO2e/MWh) 
 
While annual GHG emissions was ranked as the second most important indicator of NEM 
performance by the survey respondents, GHG intensity was ranked as the next most 
important.  As stated by Garnuat,209 “Australia’s unusually emissions-intensive electricity 
sector is the main reason why Australia’s emissions per person are exceptionally large”.  
The emissions intensity of Australia’s electricity supply is the highest of any OECD country. 
It is 98% higher than the OECD average, and 74% higher than the world average.   
Emissions in the NEM alone comprised 31% of Australia’s total emissions.210 This is 
primarily a result of Australia’s continued reliance on coal fired power generation, 
intensified by the brown coal fired power plants in the NEM.211  This can be seen in the 
intensity figures shown below inTable 26 where the NEM212 is compared to the world 
average.213 
Table 26: Greenhouse Gas Emission intensity in the NEM and the world 
Year 
NEM Energy 
Supply 
(GWh) 
Emissions 
(Mt CO2-e) 
NEM Intensity        
(g CO2-e/kWh) 
World Ave. 
Intensity 
(g CO2-e/kWh) 
Difference 
1990 117.984214 118.1 1001   
2004 186,246 178.0 956 500 91% 
2005 191,598 178.8 933 500 87% 
2006 194,107 182.1 938 501 87% 
2007 195,376 184.1 942 507 86% 
2008 197,187 186.7 947 502 89% 
2009 198,005 187.3 946   
 
While an attempt was made to assess changes in the NEM emission intensity from 1990 
against a national target or appropriate international benchmark, no national targets exist 
and data was not located as far back as 1990 for the purpose of international 
benchmarking. Given this, the most recent available data was used to compare the NEM 
against world averages. 
 
As electricity production makes up such a large percentage of both Australian and world 
GHG emissions, GHG intensity of electricity production will need to be decreased to make 
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significant reductions in total GHG emissions. This will require Australia to reduce its 
emissions intensity to bring it closer to the world average emissions intensity.  At the same 
time, as Australia reduces its emissions intensity, other countries both above and below 
the world average intensity need to commit to decreasing their own GHG intensities. The 
principle of contraction and convergence was described in the recently released Garnaut 
Report215 with a convergence date of 2050 at levels similar to those of developing countries 
today.216 This would require a reduction of 90% by 2050 to stabilise GHGs at 450ppm 
according to the earlier Garnaut Report.217  Based on this, a grading scale is show below in 
Table 27. 
 
Table 27: GHG emissions grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Less than world average 
B Close to world average 
C Above world average but falling at a rate to meet world allowable average by 
2050 
D Above world average and falling at a rate of at least half of what is required to 
meet world allowable average by 2050 
F Above world average and falling at a rate less than half of what is required to 
meet world allowable average by 2050.  
 
The GHG intensity of electricity supply in the NEM fell from 1001 g CO2-e/kWh in 1990 to 
946 g CO2-e/kWh in 2009 at a rate of 0.3% per annum. The rate required to meet the world 
allowable average by 2050 is a reduction of 5.93% per annum. Therefore, the electricity 
intensity of the NEM is only falling at 5% of the rate required to meet an allowable world 
average by 2050.  
 
Based on this result, the NEM receives an F for GHG emission intensity of electricity supply. 
 
4.3.7.3. RENEWABLE ENERGY – GRADE D 
 
KPI: Renewable energy as a proportion of total electricity generation (% of total MWh)  
 
The majority of survey respondents agreed that the proportion of electricity generated 
from renewable sources in the NEM is an important indicator representing the long term 
interests of consumers.    
 
The proportion of electricity generated from renewable energy sources has remained 
relatively stable in the NEM in the last decade, as shown in Figure 24 below. This is despite 
the introduction in 2001 of a 2% Mandatory Renewable Energy Target by 2010218 on top of 
the 1997 baseline.219 As of 2009, the proportion of renewable energy in the NEM was 9.6%.  
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The slight decline in the late 2000s can be attributed to drought conditions reducing the 
generating capacity of hydro-electric power plants. 
 
 
Figure 24: Proportion of renewable energy in the NEM220 
 
 
Since 1990, the proportion of renewable energy generation in NEM states has declined by        
-1.4% from 11%.221   Internationally, Australia ranks 20th of the 30 OECD countries in terms 
of change in the proportion of electricity generated from renewable sources between 1990 
and 2010222 (Figure 25).  The best performing OECD country is Denmark, which increased 
its proportion of renewable energy generation by 24.3%. The worst performing OECD 
country is Turkey, which saw the proportion of renewable energy electricity generation 
decline by 20.8% from 40.4% to 19.6% over the same period. The OECD weighted average 
change in proportion of renewable electricity generation is -0.1%. 
 
Figure 25: OECD countries’ change in the proportion of renewable energy 1990-2009223 
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The change in renewable energy proportion between 1990 and 2009 was chosen as the 
benchmark because rather than being a measure of a nation’s natural endowment in 
renewable energy sources (particularly hydro power), this indicator is a measure of the 
trend in the proportion of energy generated from renewable sources. Further, the time 
period indicates how electricity market reform and the establishment of the NEM which 
occurred during the 1990s have affected renewable energy generation.  The grading scale 
for this benchmark is given in Table 28. 
 
With a rank of 20 out of 30, and a change in proportion of -1.4% Australia is in the bottom 
20–40% of OECD countries.  Based on this result, the NEM receives a D for Renewable 
Energy. 
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Table 28: Renewable energy proportion grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Top 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in proportion of 
electricity generated by renewable sources 1990–2009 
B In the 60–80% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
proportion of electricity generated by renewable sources 1990–2009 
C In the 40–60% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
proportion of electricity generated by renewable sources 1990–2009 
D In the 20–40% bracket of OECD Countries with respect to the change in 
proportion of electricity generated by renewable sources 1990–2009 
F Bottom 20% of OECD Countries with respect to the change in proportion of 
electricity generated by renewable sources 1990–2009 
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4.3.8. ENERGY EFFICIENCY - GRADE D  
 
KPI: Electricity savings from utility energy efficiency programs as percentage of total 
electricity consumed (% of total MWh) 
 
Improving end use energy efficiency has large potential to save money and reduce GHG 
emissions. It can also increase energy security and reduces the strain on network 
infrastructure.  Energy efficiency investments are often cost negative – the value of energy 
savings exceed the upfront cost. A UN Foundation Report (2007) stated, ‘only energy 
efficiency can generate nearly immediate results with existing technology and proven 
policies and do so while generating strong financial returns’. Recently, ‘The Prime Minister 
identified energy efficiency as a key plan in the Government’s suite of polices to reduce 
emissions’.224 Energy efficiency (EE) is ‘widely believed to be the quickest, simplest and 
most cost-effective way to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions’. 225  The 
Government’s recently released Clean Energy Future Plan includes energy efficiency in 
homes, offices and factories as one of the four key initiatives. As stated directly in the NEO, 
the NEM has been tasked with promoting the efficient ‘use of electricity services for the 
long term interests of consumers of electricity’.   
 
Energy efficiency programs have been developed both within and external to the formal 
NEM structure.  Measures developed outside the National Electricity Rules but delivered by 
parties within the NEM include state level initiatives, such as the Victorian Energy Efficiency 
Target (VEET), the New South Wales Energy Savings Scheme (ESS) and the South Australian 
Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme (REES).  Other energy efficiency initiatives that are 
applied and delivered outside of NEM institutions include the Federal Government led 
Energy Efficiency Opportunities (EEO) program, the National Home Energy Rating Scheme 
(NatHERS), appliance energy labelling programs, Minimum Energy Performance Standards 
(MEPS) and the National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE).  Under stage two of the 
NFEE, the following five measures are being delivered:226 
 
 Expanding and enhancing the Minimum Energy Performance Standards 
(MEPS) program. 
 The heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) high efficiency systems 
strategy.  
 Phase-out of inefficient incandescent lighting. 
 Government leadership though green leases.  
 The development of measures for a national hot water strategy, for later 
consideration.  
 
There is evidence that these programs are having an impact. Per capita electricity 
consumption has fallen since 2005/06, while total electricity consumption in the NEM has 
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plateaued and fallen since 2008/09.  However, these trends are also likely influenced by 
the significant rise in electricity prices in recent years. Energy use by year is shown below in 
Table 29. 
 
Table 29: NEM Energy Use227  
Financial year Energy Use (GWh) Change from 
previous year 
Energy Use per 
capita 
(MWh/person) 
2004/05 186,246  9.07 
2005/06 191,710 2.9% 9.18 
2006/07 194,487 1.4% 9.15 
2007/08 196,428 1.0% 9.04 
2008/09 198,295 1.0% 8.96 
2009/10 198,023 -0.1% 8.82 
2010/11 (est) 196,440 -0.8% 8.60 
 
This information is also shown in Figure 26 below with forecasts out to 2021. From this 
figure, it is clear that while energy use in the NEM has fallen off in the past year, it is 
forecast to resume its historical growth trend. 
 
Figure 26: Energy Demand to 2021 
 
 
A recent report for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy (A2SE) surveyed the electricity 
network service providers (NSPs) to determine energy savings from various programs.228 
Note that these savings are only those from NSPs and do not include energy efficiency 
programs from retailers or any other entities within the NEM framework. Furthermore, 
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these savings are not necessarily a direct result of the NEM framework, but represent 
energy efficiency being undertaken in NEM jurisdictions. While the A2SE survey 
respondents only provided limited data on six EE projects, energy savings information was 
reported for five of the six. These six projects included three efficient lighting projects, one 
improved hot water system project and two mixed energy efficiency initiatives targeting 
2.37 million customers. 
 
In addition the NSP programs, programs facilitated by retailers include the Residential 
Energy Efficiency Scheme (REES) in South Australia, the NSW Energy Savings Scheme (ESS) 
and the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target Scheme (VEET). While the ESS reports energy 
savings directly229, REES and VEET report savings in terms of GHG reductions only over the 
life of the end use measure. In order to convert this into an annual energy savings, the 
value in tonnes of CO2-e must first be converted to kWh using the state based full fuel 
cycle emissions factors230 and then the energy savings must be spread out over the life time 
of the measure. For the purposes of this report, in the absence of more specific data, an 
average lifetime of five years has been assumed. This assumed medium-term lifetime 
reflects the fact that the majority of the measures are lighting replacements with a 
significant proportion of savings also coming from replacing conventional resistance water 
heaters.231 Energy savings by networks and for the three aforementioned programs are 
shown below in Table 30.  
 
Table 30: Energy Efficiency Savings in the NEM  
Year NSP 
Savings 
(GWh) 
ESS 
Savings 
(GWh) 
REES Savings 
(GWh) 
VEET Savings 
(GWh) 
Total EE 
Savings 
(GWh) 
Energy 
Savings 
(% of total 
energy used) 
2008 27.1 - - - 27 0.01% 
2009 28.9 130 43 567 768 0.39% 
2010 34.0 310 95 907 1,346 0.68% 
 
Unfortunately, data on utility EE programs have not been collected prior to 2008 in 
Australia, and the three retail programs only have data from the past two years, making 
analysis from the desired 1990 baseline impossible. 
 
The combined energy savings from the programs and initiatives described above can be 
compared to the savings achieved by the Mandatory Energy Performance Standards and 
energy rating labelling at approximately 6,600 GWh in 2010232, or roughly six times the 
energy saved from initiatives within the NEM. 
 
While no world average was found as a benchmark for performance, reporting on US 
energy savings programs is collated by the Energy Information Administration under the US 
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Department of Energy in their Electric Power Annual Report.233  These data are shown 
below in Table 31. 
 
Table 31: Energy Savings in the United States 
Financial 
year 
Energy Savings 
(GWh) 
Total Load 
(GWh) 
Energy Savings 
(% of total energy used) 
2007 68,991 4,012,728 1.72% 
2008 76,674 3,989,058 1.92% 
2009 77,906 3,832,180 2.03% 
2010 87,839 4,016,137 2.19% 
 
The only comparable jurisdiction for which data on energy efficiency savings was readily 
available was the US. There do not appear to be any technical or structural barriers to limit 
Australian performance in terms of energy savings from energy efficiency programs to be 
in line with numbers from the US. Therefore, in the absence of more comprehensive date 
the US performance at approximately 2% of energy saved as a share of total energy 
produced seems a reasonable benchmark for Australian performance from energy 
efficiency programs. A comparison of the relative performance of the US and Australian 
systems is shown below in Table 32. Based on this target, a grading scale is shown in Table 
33 below. 
 
Table 32: Relative Comparison of US and Australian Energy Efficiency Performance 
Financial 
year 
Australian / US savings 
ratio 
2008 0.7% 
2009 19.1% 
2010 31.1% 
 
Table 33: Energy Efficiency grading scale (Method 1) 
Grade Explanation 
A Exceeds US EE performance by more than 50% 
B Meets or exceeds US EE performance by up to 50% 
C Within 50% of US EE performance 
D Less than 50% of US EE performance, but percentage of EE increased from 
previous year  
F Less than 50% of US EE performance and percentage decreased from previous 
year 
 
As the percentage of energy efficiency in Australia was less than 50% of the performance in 
the US, but did increase from the previous year, the NEM receives a D for energy efficiency.      
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4.3.9. DEMAND MANAGEMENT - GRADE D 
 
KPI: Proportion of peak demand met through demand management programs (% of total 
MW peak) 
 
Demand management (DM) programs include efforts by Network Service Providers to 
reduce consumer electricity demand during peak times. DM was first introduced in 
Australia over 80 years ago with residential off peak water heating.234 DM is generally 
understood to include load management, energy efficiency, distributed generation and 
time of use meters. Despite multiple successful DM programs, many barriers remain 
caused at least in part by the large number of stakeholders including customers, DNSPs, 
retailers and market operators.  
 
In the 2009-2010 financial year, the NEM peak electricity requirement reached 33,741 MW. 
This is a reduction from the previous summer peak of 34,843 MW.235 Average annual 
growth since the 2004/05 year has been 3.5%.236  Maximum demands by state in the 
2008/9 and 2009/10 fiscal years are shown below in Figure 27.  
 
Figure 27: Peak Demand by State 
 
 
Coincident peak historical and 50% probability of occurrence medium growth scenario 
predicted demand for the NEM is shown below in Figure 28. 237 Coincident peak demand 
refers to the maximum demand that occurs in all NEM jurisdictions simultaneously and is 
less than the sum of peak demands for each state in the NEM. The 50% probability of 
occurrence medium growth scenario is the predicted NEM peak demand under a medium 
demand growth scenario where there is a 50% chance that the predicted peak demand will 
occur. 
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Figure 28: NEM Peak Demand 
 
 
A recent report prepared for the Australian Alliance to Save Energy238 analysed the results 
from a survey of electricity network service providers in Australia. In addition to programs 
delivered by NSPs, electricity market DM delivered by retailers also needs to be considered. 
The most recent AEMO Statement of Opportunities report239 outlines these electricity 
market DM initiatives. These are added to state based programs primarily targeted at 
energy efficiency, but assumed to have a demand reduction impact calculated by assuming 
that the initiatives are spread evenly across each 24 hour period. These programs include 
EES, REES and VEET all discussed in more detail in section 4.3.8. All of these types of 
programs/measures are shown below in Figure 29. Combining network, energy market and 
state based DM, total DM in the NEM is also shown in Table 34 below. 
 
 
Table 34: NEM Total Demand Management 
Year Peak Demand 
Reduction (MW) 
2008/09 281 
2009/10 340 
2010/11 (forecast) 723 
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Figure 29: Peak Demand Reduction from Network and Energy Market DM 
   
 
 
As with EE, there does not appear to be a world average benchmark for DM. Furthermore, 
there is no national target against which to benchmark or data as far back as 1990. While 
some comparison could be made against results from the WA market, the relatively small 
number of programs in WA makes it difficult to compare to the NEM. However, reporting 
on DM programs is done by the Energy Information Administration under the US 
Department of Energy in their Electric Power Annual report.240 
 
Table 35: US Demand Management 
Year Peak Load Reduction 
(MW)241 
Total Peak Demand 
(MW) 
DM 
(% of total peak demand) 
2007 30,253 782,227 3.81% 
2008 31,735 752,470 4.15% 
2009 31,682 725,958 4.29% 
2010 33,283 767,948 4.26% 
 
Data for earlier periods is shown below in Figure 30 with a division between demand 
reductions because of peak load management programs versus energy efficiency programs. 
 
Unfortunately, it appears that no data exists for Demand Management performance in 
Australia further back than 2008, precluding analysis from the desired 1990 baseline. 
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Figure 30: US Peak Demand Reduction 
 
 
As with energy efficiency, there do not appear to be any technical or structural barriers to 
limit Australian performance in terms of electricity savings from DM programs as 
proportion of peak demand to be in line with numbers from the US where reductions of 
approximately 4.3% of total peak demand have been achieved. This target can also be 
justified due to the relatively low expenditure-to-savings ratios outlined in the recent A2SE 
report.242  
 
A comparison of the relative performance of the US and Australian systems is shown below 
in Table 36. 
 
Table 36: Relative Comparison of US and Australian Demand Management Performance 
Year Australian / US savings ratio 
2008/09 18.8% 
2009/10 22.8% 
2010/11 47.0% 
 
Based on this target, a grading scale is shown in Table 37 below. 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
P
e
a
k
 D
e
m
a
n
d
 R
e
d
u
c
ti
o
n
  
(M
W
)
Year
Energy Efficiency
Peak Load Management 
73 
 
Table 37: Demand Management grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A Exceeds US DM performance by more than 50% 
B Meets or exceeds average US DM performance by up to 50% 
C Within 50% of US DM performance 
D Less than 50% of US DM performance, but DM % increased from previous year  
F Less than 50% of US DM performance and DM % decreased from previous year 
 
As previously mentioned, the metric chosen for grading was used as insufficient data was 
available to benchmark against historical performance and no national targets exist against 
which to benchmark. As the percentage of DM in Australia was less than 50% of the 
performance in the US and increased from the previous year, the NEM receives a D for 
demand management. 
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4.3.10.  PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE CUSTOMERS – GRADE C  
 
4.3.10.1. DISCONNECTIONS – GRADE C 
 
KPI: Number of disconnections of residential customers on payment plans or pensions 
 
Disconnection of an essential service, such as electricity, is expensive for both the 
consumer and the provider and creates further hardship for consumers who are already 
experiencing financial difficulties.243 The level of disconnections of residential customers on 
payment plans or pension provides a strong indicator of the NEM’s performance in meeting 
the long-term interests of customers. Survey respondents ranked the disconnection of 
residential customers on payment plans or pensions as the fifth most important KPI. The 
percentage of residential electricity customer disconnections of customers on payment 
plans and/or those on pensions or concessional discounts is shown in Table 40 below. Data 
covering this KPI was available for NSW, Vic and SA only, so data for these jurisdictions has 
been combined and presented in aggregate and used for NEM grading purposes. 
 
A proposed national grading system is presented for the NEM in Table 41. This grading 
scale is based on the New South Wales, Victorian and South Australian combined weighted 
percentage of disconnections of customers that were pensioners and/or on payment plans 
prior to disconnection.  Disconnections of residential customers previously receiving 
pensioner or concessional discounts are shown in  
Table 38 and Table 39 with a graphical depiction of the vulnerable customers in New South 
Wales, Victorian and South Australia shown in Figure 31. 
 
Data covering disconnections of residential customers on payment plans and/or pensions is 
not available for all states and territories, or for all years.  However, from July 1 2012, this 
data is to be reported for the NEM on a national scale by the AER. Data for Queensland was 
sourced from retailer rather than distributor data, as distributers do not report 
disconnections of pensioner/concession cardholders.  While distributor data is generally 
regarded as more accurate than retailer data, for consistency, data from Queensland 
electricity retailers was used for all calculations undertaken for Queensland in the 
“Disconnections” KPI.  
 
Furthermore, in Queensland, the number of small residential customers participating in a 
hardship program is reported on a quarterly basis only and no annual figures are made 
available. To avoid double counting when calculating an annual figure, the estimated 
number of customers participating in a hardship program annually has been calculated by 
averaging the quarterly figures for customers in hardship programs during 2010/11. It is 
likely that this approach underestimates the actual number of customers on hardship plans 
in Queensland in 2010/11. 
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Table 38: Disconnections of residential customers previously on payment plans 
NEM Region Year 
NSW
1
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Residential small retail customers on 
payment plans prior to disconnection 
as a % of all residential small retail 
disconnections 
– 25.0 29.5 29.2 – 
No. of residential small retail customers 
on payment plans prior to 
disconnection 
– 4,537 5,363 4,554 – 
No. of residential small retail customers 
using payment plans 
– 93,072 94,145 116,983 – 
No. of residential small retail 
disconnections 
18,339 18,153 18,168 15,595 – 
No. of residential customers 2,786,091 2,840,021 2,862,401 2,919,758 – 
Vic
2
  
Residential disconnections previously 
on a budget instalment plan as a 
percentage of residential electricity 
disconnections 
27.0 29.0 32.0 34.0 – 
No. of domestic customers on budget 
instalment plans 
97,052 86,158 84,616 92,493 – 
No. of residential disconnections 6,968 6,249 9,568 13,486 – 
No. of residential customers 2,141,284 2,164,899 2,190,588 2,248,207 – 
Qld
3
   
Estimated no. of small residential 
customers participating in hardship 
program # 
– – – – 6,102 
 
No. of small residential customer 
disconnections due to non-payment 
– – 14,853 17,913 24,598 
 
No. of small residential disconnections – – – – 128,004 
No. of residential customers 1,629,232 1,670,789 1,697,545 1,742,545 – 
SA
4
  
Residential customer disconnections for 
non-payment previously on instalment 
plans as a % of disconnections 
5.2 7.0 17.8 40.0 – 
Residential customer disconnections for 
non-payment previously on instalment 
plans 
271 411 1098 1927 – 
No. of residential customers on 
instalment plans 
15,477 21,592 19,667 22,282 – 
No. of residential customer 
disconnections 
5,190 5,839 6,118 4,748 – 
No. of residential customers 688,524 697,518 708,242 717,813 – 
Data unavailable for ACT and Tas  
Sources
: 1
IPART; 
2
 ESC; 
3 
QCA; 
4
ESCOSA and ESAA. 
# Calculated by averaging the quarterly report of customer numbers in hardship programs during 2010/11. 
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Table 39: Disconnections of vulnerable residential customers  
NEM Region Year 
NSW
1
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Residential small retail customers receiving 
pensioner energy rebate prior to 
disconnection as a % of all residential small 
retail disconnections 
– 14.6 14.6 14.4 – 
No. of residential small retail customers 
receiving pensioner energy rebate prior to 
disconnection 
– 2,642 2,659 2,245 – 
No. of residential small retail disconnections 18,339 18,153 18,168 15,595 – 
No. of residential customers 2,786,091 2,840,021 2,862,401 2,919,758 – 
Vic
2
  
Residential concession cardholder 
disconnections as a percentage of total 
residential electricity disconnections 
24.0 19.0 18.0 19.0 – 
No. of residential disconnections 6,968 6,249 9,568 13,486 – 
No. of residential customers 2,141,284 2,164,899 2,190,588 2,248,207 – 
Qld
3
  
Residential small customer 
pensioner/concession cardholder 
disconnections due to non-payment as a % of 
all residential small customer disconnections 
due to non-payment. # 
– – – – 17.8 
Residential small customer 
pensioner/concession card holder 
disconnections due to non-payment 
– – – – 4,371 
 
No. of small residential customer 
disconnections due to non-payment 
– – 14,853 17,913 24,598 
 
No. of small residential disconnections – – – – 128,004 
No. of residential customers 1,629,232 1,670,789 1,697,545 1,742,545 – 
SA
4
  
Residential customer disconnections for non-
payment who are concession recipients as a % 
of total disconnections 
6.7 5.0 10.2 12.0 – 
Residential customer disconnections for non-
payment who are concession recipients 
350 294 632 568 – 
No. of residential customer disconnections 5,190 5,839 6,118 4,748 – 
No. of residential customers 688,524 697,518 708,242 717,813 – 
Data not available for ACT and Tas  
Sources: 
1
IPART; 
2
 ESC; 
3
QCA; 
4
ESCOSA and ESAA  
# Only data covering pensioner/concession cardholder disconnections due to non-payment is available. To present an 
appropriate figure for comparison, residential small customer pensioner/concession cardholder disconnections are 
presented as a percentage of all residential customer disconnections due to non-payment only.  
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Figure 31: NSW1, Vic2 and SA3 Vulnerable Customer Disconnections 
 
Sources: 
1
IPART; 
2
 ESC; 
3
ESCOSA 
 
Unfortunately, suitable international benchmarking data for NEM was not found. For 
instance, residential electricity disconnections are reported in the UK,244 however data 
covering customers on payment plans or pensions prior to disconnection is not made 
public. National historical data against which to benchmark the NEM is also lacking. 
 
Table 40: NSW, Vic and SA combined pensioner and payment plan disconnection data 
NSW1, Vic2 and SA3 Combined Disconnection 
Data 
Year 
% of pensioners and customers on payment plans 
among residential electricity disconnections 
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
20% 22% 24% 
Sources: 
1
IPART; 
2
 ESC; 
3
ESCOSA 
 
Table 41: NEM customer disconnection grading scale 
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Based on the grading scale presented in Table 41, the NEM (NSW, Vic and SA) receives a C 
for the proportion of disconnections made up of customers on pensions and/or payment 
plans in 2010. 
 
4.3.10.2. ‘ENERGY POVERTY’ – UNGRADED 
 
KPI: Number of households that are 'energy poor' i.e. electricity costs are greater than 
10% of household budget 
 
Energy poverty has been a significant focus for governments, the energy sector and social 
welfare organisations particularly across Europe.  In Australia, there has been extensive 
discussion of energy affordability, access and hardship, however there has been a 
reluctance to take on the terminology of fuel poverty. For example, some stakeholder 
survey respondents commented that the term was simplistic and the 10% figure arbitrary.  
The number of households that are energy poor was ranked as the eighth highest KPI by all 
survey respondents, but equal 19th by residential consumer advocates (see Table 54)..  
With this in mind a discussion of energy poverty in Australia is given in this Report in 
addition to the KPI of the number of disconnections of residential customers on payment 
plans or pensions.    
 
In the UK, the standard definition of energy or fuel poverty is a household that needs to 
“spend more than 10% of its income on fuel for adequate heating (usually 21 degrees for 
the main living area, and 18 degrees for other occupied rooms)”.245  However, it should be 
noted that a review of this definition is currently underway.  In a recent paper for AGL on 
energy poverty in Australia, Simshauser et al.246 defined energy poverty in the Australian 
context as “a household that actually spends more than 10% of its income on energy”.  It 
should be noted that their report simplified its analysis by focusing on all-electric housing 
stock, thus eliminating the need to model the role of gas.   
 
Using this Australian definition and associated modelling, Simshauser et al247 estimate that 
33% of low income households 248  or 6.6% of all NSW and QLD households 249  will 
experience fuel poverty by 2015–16.  Their modelling suggests that in 2008–09 those in the 
lowest disposable household income quintile spent an average of just below 7% of their 
income in electricity.  Only those households in the lowest quintile who consumed 
12,000kWh of electricity per year or more were likely to experience fuel poverty in 2008–
09.  It is estimated that 12% of households in the lowest quintile consume more than 
12,000kWh per year. This suggests that over the current period to 2015–16 the incidence 
of fuel poverty is likely to rise significantly from 12% of low income households in 2008–09 
to 33% in 2015–16.  
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Despite the fact that some modelling of fuel poverty numbers has been done for NSW and 
QLD250 the data is not sufficient to provide an overall grade for the NEM.   While there is 
likely to be a rise in energy poverty in the NEM and this is of concern and should be 
addressed, the NEM scores an Ungraded (UG) for Energy Poverty. 
 
This is another area where the collection and reporting of more reliable and consistent 
data across the NEM would be desirable. 
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4.3.11. CUSTOMER SATISFACTION – GRADE C 
 
4.3.11.1. COMPLAINTS – GRADE C 
 
KPI: Number of complaints per year 
 
Customer complaints provide a measure of the NEM’s performance in terms of end use 
customer expectations. Historical NEM electricity customer complaints directed to 
electricity retailers, as a percentage of total customers and a NEM-wide weighted average, 
are presented in Table 42 below.  The volume of customer complaints directed to 
electricity retailers provides a general measure of the quality of service and how well the 
expectations of end use customers are being met. Data covering complaints lodged with 
jurisdictional regulators and/or ombudsman have not been included.  
 
 
Table 42: Retail customer complaints as a percentage of total customers251 
Retail customer complaints as a percentage of total customers 
State Year 
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
QLD – – 1.0 1.6 
NSW 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Vic 0.7 0.8 1.0 2.3 
SA 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.2 
Tas 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 
ACT 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.9 
Weighted NEM 
Average (%) 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.92 
 
Research was undertaken to locate international data on the volume of residential 
electricity customer complaints and trends for the purpose of benchmarking NEM 
performance. Unfortunately, differences in the ways complaints are classified and recorded 
made an international comparison difficult. In light of this a proposed national grading 
scale for the NEM based on historical performance is presented in Table 43 below. The 
grading scale was developed by assigning an “A” for NEM weighted average percentages of 
customer complaints that are lower than the lowest customer complaints percentage 
achieved in any NEM region in the last five years. Similarly an “F” was assigned for NEM 
weighted customer complaints percentages above the highest percentage recorded in any 
NEM region. The intermediate grades are distributed evenly between these minimum and 
maximum historical values.  
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Table 43: Weighted NEM average % of customer complaints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the above grading scale the NEM receives a C for customer complaints in 2009. 
      
4.3.11.2. SURVEYED CUSTOMER SATISFACTION – UNGRADED 
 
KPI: Surveyed Customer Satisfaction 
 
While surveying customers is one of the best ways of determining whether the NEM is 
working in their long term interests, currently, none of the organisations responsible for 
the functioning of the NEM undertake regular customer satisfaction surveys.  
Internationally a number of electricity regulators survey customers on a regular basis.  
Examples include OFGEM in the UK and the Californian Public Utility Commission.252  In 
Australia, while AEMO is considering surveying consumers regarding the national Value of 
Customer Reliability (VCR), currently no data is available on surveyed customer satisfaction.  
As such, the NEM receives an Ungraded for surveyed customer satisfaction.   
  
Grade  Weighted NEM Average % of customer complaints in 2009 
A < 0.3 % 
B 0.3–0.8 % 
C 0.8–1.3 % 
D 1.8–2.3 % 
F > 2.3 % 
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4.3.12. LEVEL OF COMPETITION – GRADE B  
 
KPI: Extent of market concentration 
 
Survey respondents ranked the extent of market concentration KPI as equal third in 
importance. This is probably a reflection of the public’s understanding that customers 
generally receive a better deal when purchasing products and services from businesses 
that operate in competitive markets. In line with this understanding the NEM retail sector 
has progressively been moved towards greater competition, with Tasmania the only 
remaining NEM jurisdiction without “full retail contestability”.253  
 
The NEM involves dynamic trading between electricity generators, wholesalers and 
retailers based on variable pricing levels that are influenced by demand. 254  Market 
concentration, also known as industry concentration or market power, provides a measure 
of company market share and thus an indication of the level of competition in the market. 
Traditional measures for market concentration include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and concentration ratio (CR(n)).255 
 
However, the NEM (and other competitive electricity systems) are unlike other markets, as 
demand and supply for the product (electricity) must be matched continuously and 
instantaneously, as electricity supply cannot be economically stored. This and other 
characteristics of the NEM mean traditional measures of market concentration vary with 
situation and time, and in response to factors such as interconnection or inter-regional 
trade. 256  In particular, the reliability of these measures as indicators of market 
concentration in electricity generation markets is disputed.257 
 
London Economics & Global Energy Decisions 258  suggest the traditional tools of 
competition analysis should be used in concert with measures designed specifically for 
electricity market analysis, such as the Residual Supply Index (RSI) and the Pivotal Supplier 
Index (PSI). These measures focus on company market share, identifying the 
indispensability (or ‘pivotalness’) of companies to meeting demand. The more 
indispensable/pivotal a company is, the more market power that company is considered to 
have.259 However, they reported that even with detailed analysis, uncontrolled factors in 
their analysis may have caused the appearance of market power, and that the existence of 
market power is not necessarily evidence of its abuse260. 
 
 The AEMC is currently investigating potential electricity generator market power in the 
NEM.261 Prompted by a submission from Major Energy Users Inc., the results of this work is 
expected to be released later in 2012. 
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With the above constraints in mind annual HHI market concentration values for NEM 
generation market share by capacity are presented in Table 44. HHI data for years prior to 
2006 was not available at the time of writing this report. 
 
Table 44: Market Concentration for NEM generation sector by capacity262  
Annual HHI (Market Concentration) Values for NEM Generation by Capacity 
HHI  
(Market 
Concentration) 
Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
751 720 775 774 728 
 
Average HHI market concentration values for electricity generation for selected European 
countries is presented below in Table 45 below. 
 
Table 45: Electricity generation market concentration (selected countries 2003 & 2005)263 
Country HHI (Electricity generation markets Market Concentration) 
BE Belgium 8,307 
DE Germany 1,914 
ES Spain 2,790 
FR France 8,592 
NL Netherlands 2,332 
GB Great Britain 1,068 
 
A potential grading scale for market concentration in the NEM generation sector is 
presented in Table 46 below. The grades in Table 46 are based on the U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission – Horizontal Merger Guidelines that state the 
following bounds for HHI market concentration measures: 
 
Table 46: US Dept. of Justice, market concentration bounds for horizontal mergers264  
Unconcentrated Markets:  HHI below 1500   
Moderately Concentrated Markets:  HHI between 1500 and 2500 
Highly Concentrated Markets:  HHI above 2500 
Also considered is the ACCC’s use of HHI when assessing the potential impact of mergers 
on a market. The ACCC will generally be less likely to identify horizontal competition 
concerns when the post-merger HHI is less than 2000, or greater than 2000 with a post-
merger change in HHI of less than 100.265 
 
The overarching theme of the proposed grading scales is increased competition in 
electricity generation which should lead to a better deal for the electricity consumer and 
support their long term interests. 
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Table 47: NEM HHI market concentration generation grading scale 
Grade Explanation 
A HHI < 1500 
B HHI > 1500 and < 1835 
C HHI > 1835 and < 2170 
D HHI > 2170 and < 2500 
F HHI > 2500 
 
On the basis of the grading scale in Table 47 the NEM generation market receives an A. 
 
Retail electricity market 
Within the NEM, individual markets govern supply in both wholesale and retail sectors with 
a purported open access regime in place for the transmission and distribution networks. 
These networks are subject to price regulation in recognition of the potential for market 
power abuse.266  The energy supply industry sectors display ownership links, as significant 
vertical integration exists between energy retail markets and upstream energy 
production.267 
  
Within the NEM, all jurisdictions, except Tasmania, now have full retail contestability (FRC) 
allowing all customers to enter into a contract with their retailer of choice.268 
The AEMC assesses the effectiveness of retail competition in each NEM jurisdiction269 but 
these reviews are often undertaken at different times (e.g. 2008 VIC and SA, 2010 ACT) and 
as such, may be difficult to incorporate in an annual benchmark indicator. 
 
Table 48: Market concentration of state electricity retail markets in NEM 
State 
Based on Small Residential Electricity Customer Numbers  
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index - HHI) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Vic1,4,6 2963 2730 2566 2518 2504 2514 
SA1,2,5 6380 5054 3862 3411 3505 3618 
Tas1* 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 
Qld2 - - 3554 2890 - - 
NSW3 - - - - - 2405 
ACT - - - - - 8925^ 
Weighted 
Average 
- - - - - 3009# 
1AER, 2010 p.96 taken from graph; 2AER, 2009 p.195 taken from graph; 3IPART, 2011 p.5; 
4AER, 2007 p.173; 5ESCOSA , 2010 p. 26; 6ESC, 2010 p.3; ^AEMC, 2010 p.25 Quarter 4 2009 
value; #Qld omitted from NEM average HHI as data not available. 
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*Legislation prevents entry of new suppliers in the small residential market270 
More frequently reported data that has been used to indicate competition in the retail 
electricity market is “churn” or the transfer from one electricity retailer to another.271, 272 
However, this indicator is also an imperfect measure of market competition.273,274 
 
With the above constraints in mind, a depiction of market concentration in the retail NEM 
is presented in Table 48 above, calculated using retailer market share by customer number 
data published annually in the AER’s State of the Energy Market report.   
 
For the purposes of benchmarking NEM retail HHI market concentration, data for EU 
countries based on customer number in 2010 is presented in Table 49 and data for Great 
Britain alone is presented in Table 50. 
 
Table 49: Market concentration in residential retail electricity market in the EU275 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Based on 2010  retail customer numbers 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI) 
Germany 300 
Finland 600 
Austria 700 
Sweden 700 
United Kingdom 1400 
Poland 1500 
Netherlands 1850 
Denmark 2300 
Slovenia 2300 
Slovakia 2700 
Romania 2900 
Hungary 3000 
Spain 3000 
Czech Republic 3400 
Bulgaria 3400 
Belgium 4000 
Lithuania 4400 
Ireland 4600 
Luxembourg 4800 
Italy 7200 
France 8400 
Portugal 8700 
Estonia 8800 
Latvia 9700 
Cyprus 10000 
Greece 10000 
Malta 10000 
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Table 50: HHI market concentration for Great Britain 
National Domestic Electricity Market 
Year HHI Market Concentration 
2008 1735 
2009 1751 
Ofgem & NIAUR 2009 p.29; Ofgem & NIAUR 2010 p.30 
 
Table 51: NEM HHI market share international grading scale 
Grade 
Explanation (HHI electricity retails market concentration rank for 
EU countries - lowest to highest) 
A Within top 5 EU Countries with respect to market concentration 
B Within top 10 EU Countries with respect to market concentration 
C Within top 15 EU Countries with respect to market concentration 
D Within top 20 EU Countries with respect to market concentration 
F Within top 25 EU Countries with respect to market concentration 
 
A weighted average for the NEM HHI in 2010, bar Queensland, was calculated as 3009. 
Based on the grading scale presented in Table 51 the NEM scores a C for retail market 
concentration. 
 
Network market power 
Normally discussions of market concentration relate to the level of market power within a 
competitive market. However, it is worth noting that the greatest level of potential market 
power is not in the generation or retail sectors but in the network sector.  It is generally not 
appropriate to talk about market concentration in this part of electricity sector as the 
networks are natural and regulated monopolies so there is effectively no market. For this 
reason discussion of market concentration is not considered here in relation to electricity 
networks. 
Given the natural monopoly character of electricity networks, this market power need not 
be a barrier to the efficient operation of electricity markets, provided networks are 
competitively neutral between network infrastructure on one hand and distributed 
generation, demand management and energy efficiency on the other.  The evidence 
presented in this report, as in numerous reports on this topic, would suggest in practice 
this competitive neutrality is often absent. The reasons for this are complex but relate to a 
number of factors including the form of regulation, the nature of policy settings and 
organisational culture. (For further discussion of these institutional barriers please see the 
CSIRO Intelligent Grid, Institutional Barriers to Intelligent Grid, Working Paper 4.1.276)  The 
range of policy and regulatory measures that can be and have been applied to address 
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these barriers include changing economic regulatory incentives and separation of the role 
of network planning from network operation. For further information, please refer to 
sections 3 and 4 of the CSIRO Intelligent Grid, 20 Policy Tools for Developing Distributed 
Energy, Working Paper 4.2277  
To provide a grade for overall NEM market concentration, a simple average of the scores 
for generation sector (A) and retail sector (C) market concentration was taken, while no 
account was taken for the impact of network monopoly.   This means that the NEM scores 
a B for market concentration. 
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4.4.SURVEY RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ON NEM PERFORMANCE 
 
As part of the stakeholder consultation survey, respondents were asked to rate how the 
NEM is performing with respect to the NEO.  This enables a comparison to be made 
between the results of the Report Card and how different stakeholders perceive the 
performance of the NEM. 
  
Figure 32: How well is the NEM meeting its Objective 
 
 
Survey Question: “To what extent do you believe the overall National Electricity Market is currently 
promoting the efficient investment in and operation and use of, electricity services for the long term interests 
of electricity consumers?” 
 
Figure 32 indicates that only 20% of survey respondents think the NEM is currently fulfilling 
the NEO well or very well, while 53% of respondents believe the NEO is being poorly or 
very poorly fulfilled. When the NEM is broken into component parts (Figure 33), 
respondents think the distribution sector is the sector that is performing worst with 
respect to the long term interest of consumers. Additionally, less than 10% of respondents 
believe that the electricity retail sector and regulation and oversight organisations are 
operating very well or well with respect to the long term interests of consumers.  
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Figure 33: How well are elements of the NEM serving consumers’ interests? 
 
Survey Question – “To what extent do you think these elements of the NEM are currently operating in the 
long term interests of electricity consumers?” 
 
Survey participants were also asked to rate the operation of the NEM in relation to both 
the existing criteria for the long term interest of consumers (Figure 34) and potential 
additional criteria for the long term interest of consumers (Figure 35).  
 
Figure 34: How well is the NEM meeting the existing criteria of the NEO? 
 
Survey Question – “How well do you believe the National Electricity Market is performing with respect to the 
existing criteria for the long term interest of consumers?” 
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Figure 35: How well is the NEM meeting other possible criteria for the NEO? 
 
Survey Question – “How well do you believe the National Electricity Market is performing with respect to 
other criteria for the long term interest of consumers?” 
 
To compare the survey responses with the grades given in this report card, an average was 
taken of the responses from Figure 34 and Figure 35 and then converted into a grade, the 
results of which are shown in Table 52, shows that for the existing NEO criteria for long 
term interest of consumers, stakeholders consider the NEM to be operating better on 
reliability and worse on price than the Report Card results, while for the additional criteria  
the Report Card gives Customer Bills and Protection of Vulnerable Consumers a higher 
grade, but Environmental Performance, Demand Management and Customer Satisfaction a 
lower grade than stakeholders on average. The largest discrepancy between the Report 
Card and Stakeholder Survey grading results is with Customer Bills, which is discussed in 
more detail in Section  4.5.3. 
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Table 52: NEM Performance Ranking – Report Card versus Stakeholder Survey 
Current NEO Criteria Grade (Report Card) Grade (Stakeholder Survey) 
Reliability B B 
Security of Supply C C 
Quality Ungraded C 
Safety  Ungraded B 
Price C D 
Possible New Criteria   
Customer bills B D 
Environmental performance F D 
Energy efficiency D D 
Demand management D D 
Protection of vulnerable consumers C D 
Customer satisfaction C C 
Level of Competition B C 
 
 
4.5.DISCUSSION 
 
4.5.1. DATA ADEQUACY  
 
Perhaps the most significant finding from the process of developing a NEM Report Card has 
been the lack of adequate publicly accessible data.  One might expect that for the criteria 
which are currently included in the NEO – price, reliability, quality safety and security of 
supply that there would be good consistent data available.   
 
Instead, what has been observed is that even for fundamentally important criteria the data 
is often poor, inconsistent or incomplete, particularly relating to the consumer side of the 
market.  For example, while there is half-hour reporting on the wholesale electricity price 
for power stations, the residential retail electricity price KPI has a gap in transparent 
reporting across the NEM from when the Electricity Supply Association of Australia (ESAA) 
stopped publishing pricing information in 2004 until 2011 when AEMC undertook their 
recent pricing report.  This is particularly the case in Victoria, where no state body has 
reported on trends in electricity pricing since full retail market deregulation was 
introduced.  
 
There is even less data for those criteria (e.g. demand management, energy efficiency, 
customer satisfaction, protection of vulnerable consumers etc.) that are on the demand 
side and not currently incorporated into the NEO.  Conversely, one of the most 
comprehensive data sets found was for environmental indicators, despite a lack of 
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inclusion in the NEO.  In particular, there is good data available on renewable energy 
generation and greenhouse gas emissions in the NEM, which are both primarily functions 
of supply side activity and emissions reporting is required as part of Australia’s 
international climate commitments.    Indeed, this imbalance in available data reflects a 
focus of the NEM on the supply side at the expense of the demand side that has widely 
recognized, including by the MCE.278  
 
In the case of other criteria currently included in the NEO the availability of the data is 
mixed.  For the safety KPIs, with the exception of the ESAA, there is no consistent reporting 
across states in the NEM, while for security of supply, there is no clear indicator of how 
well the NEM is operating.  The issues of what are security of supply and reliability is 
discussed in more detail below.   
 
For the additional criteria to address long term interests of consumers as proposed by this 
report the quality of the data available is also very variable.  There was either a complete 
lack of data or inconsistent data across states for the protection of vulnerable consumers.  
When it comes to customer satisfaction, no survey data is available at a NEM level and 
there is no public customer satisfaction data other than data on complaints.  For the level 
of competition there does not seem to be a KPI or data available that adequately addresses 
the complexity of the electricity market.   
 
In summary, the key data inadequacies identified through this report are: 
 lack of appropriate KPIs 
 lack of current data 
 lack of consistent data/reporting across the NEM states 
 lack of time series data 
 lack of or differently reported international data to compare and benchmark 
against. 
There is a clear need and capacity within the substantial resources of the NEM and its 
institution to address these data inadequacies.  The severe deficiency in data raises the 
question: How can stakeholders be confident whether the NEM is fulfilling its objective and 
operating in the long term interests of consumers if basic data is not collected or has not 
been measured consistently across the NEM or over time?   And as the maxim often 
attributed to Lord Kelvin states:  If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it. 
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4.5.2. MEASURING RELIABILITY AND SECURITY OF SUPPLY IN THE NEM 
 
Our survey respondents identified two KPIs related to the security and reliability of 
electricity supply in the NEM as being of high importance to the long-term interests of 
electricity consumers. There were:  
 
 Reliability - System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
 Security of supply - System-wide demand exceeding generation capacity - MWh of 
unmet load 
 
The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) defines security and reliability of supply as 
follows: 
 
Security of supply is a measure of the power system's capacity to continue operating 
within defined technical limits even in the event of the disconnection of a major power 
system element such as an interconnector or large generator279. 
 
Reliability is a measure of the power system's capacity to continue to supply sufficient 
power to satisfy customer demand, allowing for the loss of generation capacity280. 
 
For the purposes of reporting the above definitions of reliability and security are further 
defined below.   
 
Under the National Electricity Rules (NER) the AEMO is responsible for maintaining the 
security of the NEM (NER, Version 45, clause 4.3.1 p.295) and the AEMC Reliability Panel is 
responsible for maintaining the reliability of the NEM. 
 
The AEMC Reliability Panel measures NEM reliability performance using the Unserved 
Energy (USE) indicator. The Reliability Standard, 0.002% USE, is the maximum expected 
amount of energy at risk of not being delivered to customers due to a lack of available 
capacity.281 Supply interruptions in transmission and distribution networks that do not 
impact on inter-regional transfer capability are not included in USE.282 As such, the 
Reliability Standard applies to supply interruptions classified as reliability events283 that 
originate in the generation sector and the inter-regional elements of the transmission 
sector.284  
 
The Reliability Standard only considers USE due to lack of generation or inter-regional 
transmission during normal operation of the network within its designed security level, i.e. 
during a single contingency (credible) event, but not during a multiple contingency (non-
credible) events. Any USE experienced due to a multiple contingency event or due to the 
management of multiple contingency events is classed as a security285 event.286 
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The distinction between reliability and security events outlined above can be confusing. 
Similar, and perhaps easier to follow, definitions are provided by the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). ‘Adequacy’, “ the ability of the electric system to 
supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of electricity consumers at 
all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of 
system components” is used by NERC as a analogue of Australia’s NEMs “reliability”. The 
NERC analogue of the NEMs “security” is termed “Operating reliability” and refers to “the 
ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short 
circuits or unanticipated loss of system components”287.  
 
The AEMC Reliability Panel reports NEM reliability performance annually in terms of USE in 
the Annual Market Performance Review.  
 
Reliability of the distribution sector is reported using standards such as System Average 
Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
and Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) and in some cases Momentary 
Average Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI).288 
 
The AEMO is responsible for maintaining security of supply in the NEM in line with the 
security standards outlined in the NER. The NER defines a satisfactory operating state that 
requires: 
 
 frequency within limits  
 voltage within limits  
 current flows within ratings  
 plant being operated within limits  
 potential faults within circuit breaker capabilities  
 power system conditions are stable 
 
The above states are defined in the following technical standard frameworks:  
• System standards define the performance of the power system, the nature of the 
electrical network and the quality of power supplied. 
• Access standards specify the performance standards required in order to gain access 
to the network. 
• Plant standards set out the technology specific standards that if met by particular 
facilities would ensure compliance with the access standards. 
 
AEMO’s role is to maintain the power system in a secure operating state, meeting the 
above limits and technical standards. As with reliability, the system must comply with these 
standards following a single credible contingency event only.289  Security performance is 
reported by the AEMC Reliability Panel in the Annual Electricity Market Performance 
Review.290  
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There are no overall NEM criteria for security however the following security related 
criteria are reported: 
 actual and forecast minimum reserve levels  
 maximum demand forecasts  
 transmission outages  
 accuracy of AEMO forecasts (medium term, short term and pre-dispatch)  
 multiple contingency events  
 frequency (no. of excursion events per year and duration; standard deviation of 
frequency), voltage and system stability  
 inherent system aspects to address security  
 power system directions (security safety net) 
 
Much of the data used by AEMO to ascertain if the NEM is operating in a secure fashion is 
not publically reported and there is currently no reported overall system wide indicator for 
security. This situation is further constrained by the NER (Version 45, clause 4.2.4 p.293) 
defining the power system (NEM) as operating in a secure state if the AEMO, in its 
“reasonable opinion”, considers it is secure.  
 
Publication of indicators measuring NEM current and historical performance against an 
overall security indicator is suggested as a valid measure to aid transparency, to benchmark 
security and also to measure improvements in the security of electricity supply in the NEM. 
An example of what can be achieved may be seen on the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) interactive reliability indicator website 
http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=4%7C331.  
 
This information provides assessment and trends on far more reliability and security 
indicators than currently reported in the NEM. It is our opinion that a similar level of 
information availability would aid development and planning in the NEM. 
 
4.5.3. BILLS AND PRICES 
 
The analysis of electricity bills as a proportion of household income, and analysis of 
residential, business and small business electricity prices highlights a series of issues: 
1. Electricity prices in Australia are rising rapidly, however they are still some of the 
lowest in the world.   
2. While residential electricity prices are significantly higher than business electricity 
prices, small business electricity prices are rising fastest 
3. Electricity bills as a proportion of household income declined between 2003–04 and 
2009–10. While there have been two significant electricity price rises since then, 
there has also been a trend to use less electricity.291  As such it is likely that 
electricity bills as a proportion of household income in NEM states are still some of 
the lowest in the world.   
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Additionally, during the development of this report a series of issues have arisen about the 
choice between price-based indicators and bills-based indicators for inclusion in the NEO.  
While the price of electricity is an obvious choice for a KPI, what consumers actually feel is 
the bill they pay.  Focusing solely on price only takes into account energy supply; it is a 
supply-side KPI.  This is unsurprising given the strong supply-side focus the NEM to date.  
However, consumer electricity bills are a function of both supply and demand – the 
electricity price and the amount of electricity that consumers use.   
 
The inclusion of electricity price as the criterion in the NEO instead of customer electricity 
bills also leads to a series of tensions with other existing and potential criteria for the long 
term interest of consumers.  For example, a focus on keeping prices low often results in a 
lack of incentive to undertake energy efficiency and demand management measures, 
leading to large electricity consumption growth rates and associated growth in electricity 
bills.  Further, keeping prices low can come at the expense of sufficient investment to keep 
the NEM operating reliably and securely.  Additionally, making it a requirement for 
organisations in the NEM to work to keep electricity prices low makes it likely they will 
oppose the inclusion of social and environmental externalities if they raise prices, even if 
ignoring such externalities may not be in the long term interest of consumers.  One 
example of this is increasing greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this discussion.  Firstly, that within any set of criteria 
for the long term interest of consumers, there will be tensions and as such compromises 
might have to be made, as win-win-win solutions may not always be available. However, by 
including a comprehensive range of criteria for the long term interest of consumers in the 
NEO, trade-offs that are currently implicit will be made explicit and thus more transparent.  
Secondly, electricity bills are a much more appropriate indicator of the long term interest 
of consumers than electricity price in isolation.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Based on the analysis in this Report Card, a number of conclusions can be drawn and three 
recommendations are offered.  Two relate to reporting performance of the NEM against the 
NEO and one relates to the NEO itself and responsibility within the NEM for protecting the 
social and environmental aspects of the long term interests of consumers. 
 
The first conclusion is that there is quite limited publicly available data on the performance 
of the NEM in relation to the long term interest of consumers.  This is the case for the 
existing and possible additional criteria included in the National Electricity Objective.  
Whichever criteria are included in the objective of the National Electricity Market, it is crucial 
that more relevant, reliable and consistent data be collected and reported.  It is therefore 
desirable that more comprehensive reporting be undertaken with regards to NEM 
performance.  
 
While organisations such as AEMO, AER and AEMC report extensively on different aspects of 
the NEM, currently no organisation has responsibility for directly reporting on NEM 
performance with respect to the NEO.  The purpose of reporting against the NEO annually 
would be to ensure consumers can accurately assess NEM operation and decision making.   
 
It is recommended that such reporting should be in a format similar to this Report Card.  This 
should involve annual reporting against specific KPIs and benchmarks relevant to the long 
term interest of electricity consumers.  These could be included in the AER’s annual State of 
the Energy Market Report.  This annual reporting should highlight where the NEM is 
performing well and help to identify potential areas for improvement.   
 
Such reporting could also provide an informal trigger to address areas where the NEM may 
be found to be performing poorly.  This would be analogous to current arrangements in the 
spot market price for electricity in the NEM.  When the spot market price exceeds 
$5000/MWh it triggers the AER to undertake a report investigating the cause of the high 
price event.  A KPI which scores particularly poorly relative to a target or benchmark in an 
annual report of NEM performance against the NEO could similarly trigger an investigation 
as to the cause and identify strategies to improve performance.   
 
The lack of adequate reporting against the NEO is a clear gap in the NEM that can and should 
be addressed.  One way to effect this could be via a change to the National Electricity Rules, 
however more informal options are also available.  Whatever means are adopted to enact 
such a recommendation, it is important that they be supported and endorsed by the state, 
territory and federal energy ministers, through the Standing Council on Energy and 
Resources (SCER).   
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Recommendation 1:  That the Standing Council on Energy and Resources requires annual 
public performance reporting of the National Electricity Market against the criteria of the 
National Electricity Objective. 
 
A second conclusion that arises from the Report Card analysis is that there is very limited 
publicly available data with regards to several of the KPIs.  These KPIs are important for 
understanding how the NEM is performing with respect to both the existing and proposed 
criteria for the long term interest of consumers.  As such, it is recommended that further 
reporting be undertaken with regards to NEM performance in the areas of: 
 Customer Bills 
 Energy Efficiency 
 Demand Management 
 Protection of Vulnerable Customers  
 Customer Satisfaction 
 Security of Supply 
 Safety 
 Level of Competition. 
The KPIs that lack data relate to both criteria currently included in the NEO as well as areas 
currently excluded from the NEO.  There is a notable lack of information available on the 
demand side of the market, while supply side reporting is relatively more accessible.   
 
Recommendation 2:  That public reporting on the performance of the NEM should be 
extended for the consumer side of the market, particularly in relation to customer bills, 
customer energy efficiency, demand management, protection of vulnerable customers and 
customer satisfaction. 
 
In the most recent round of reforms of the National Electricity Market, social and 
environmental objectives were deliberately excluded from the NEO.  Research for this report 
indicates that consumer advocates clearly identify that the social and environmental impacts 
of the NEM affect the long term interest of consumers.  The Report Card results suggest that 
the current policy of seeking to achieve social and environmental outcomes in the electricity 
sector only through policies external to the NEM and the NEO has not delivered very good 
results either in practice or according to stakeholders perception, and may even have 
adversely impacted on some consumer interest criteria within the NEO, such as price.  Given 
that all decisions in the NEM are considered against the NEO, there is likely to be significant 
benefit in incorporating environmental and social criteria for the long term interest of 
consumers into the NEO. International precedents for the inclusion of social and 
environmental consideration into the formal objectives of the electricity markets can be 
found in the US, Canada and the UK.  
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Recommendation 3:  That the National Electricity Objective should be amended to 
incorporate social and environmental criteria for the long term interest of consumers in 
addition to the existing technical and price criteria.   
 
This Report Card has found that the NEM is not performing well against a series of social and 
environmental criteria, such as customer satisfaction, protection of vulnerable consumers, 
greenhouse gas emissions (both total emissions and emissions intensity per unit of energy 
generated), demand management, energy efficiency and renewable energy. Including the 
full range of criteria for the long term interests of consumers in the NEO, would make the 
implicit trade-offs that are already being made more transparent within the decision making 
processes of the NEM.   
 
While the inclusion of social and environmental criteria within the NEO would probably not 
lead to immediate changes in the operation or performance of the NEM, their inclusion 
would be likely to lead to consideration of policy and rule changes where appropriate and 
greater attention by NEM institutions to addressing poor performance in these areas.  
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APPENDIX A – REPORT CARD METHODOLOGY 
 
Given the debate around the objectives and performance of the NEM (Section 3), the 
following method was developed to define the ‘long-term interests of consumers’ and assess 
the NEM’s performance according to the criteria identified for consumers’ long term 
interests.  The methodology is in seven parts as identified in Figure 36.  The first six parts are 
outlined in this methodology, as they form the basis for the Report Card (Part 7) and the 
subsequent development of recommendations. 
 
Figure 36: NEM Report Card methodology flow chart  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.1 PART 1 – LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
An initial literature review was undertaken of academic articles, inquiry submissions, and a 
wide range of relevant industry reports, both Australian and international,.  As with the 
survey, the literature review sought to identify the opinions of stakeholders on the NEO and 
the performance of the NEM by examining evidence from the literature. Additionally, this 
process informed the development of a stakeholder survey, particularly identifying which 
key performance indicators (KPIs) and criteria for long term interests of consumers could 
2. List of possible criteria 
and KPIs for consumer 
interest  
1. Literature Review  
4. Prioritised criteria and 
KPIs 
3. Stakeholder Survey  
5. Sought data on the KPIs 
6. Benchmarked KPIs 
7. Report Card 
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and should be considered in this project.  The literature review also informed the KPI scoring 
process and the discussion of implications.   
 
The literature review focused on the key questions below. 
1. What statements have been made about the NEM related to the long term interests 
of consumers from organisations involved in the NEM?  
2. How have other related national and international organisations approached their 
overarching electricity system objectives? 
3. How successful have these approaches been? What evidence is available? 
4. What steps have been proposed for changing the NEM to better reflect the ‘long 
term interests of consumers of electricity’? 
5. What steps have been taken to date within the NEM to meet both the National 
Electricity Objective (NEO) and the ‘long term interests of consumers of electricity’? 
6. Are environmental interests an integral part of the ‘long term interests of consumers 
of electricity’? 
7. Should the NEM include additional environmental or social criteria beyond those 
specified in the NEO? 
8. What are the key issues associated with the NEM’s performance in the long term 
interest of consumers? 
9. To what extent are Distributed Energy (DE) and Demand Side Participation (DSP)  
integral to the ‘long term interests of consumers’? 
10. How effective has the NEM been in encouraging distributed energy and demand side 
participation?  
11. Is the energy market framework frustrating efforts to meet the ‘long term interests 
of consumers of electricity? If yes, why/how? If no why not? 
 
 
A.2 PART 2 – LIST OF POSSIBLE CRITERIA AND KPIS FOR CONSUMER INTEREST  
 
The choice of performance measures can have a powerful impact on the behaviour of 
institutions.  As author and Club of Rome member Donella Meadows observed, “indicators 
arise from values (we measure what we care about) and they create values (we care about 
what we measure)” (Meadows, 1998, p2 ).  This is particularly true of the criteria for the long 
term interests of consumers chosen for inclusion in the National Energy legislation.  As 
discussed in Section 0, the five criteria stated in the NEO1 reflect what the architects of the 
NEM “cared about” or considered to be priorities, with respect to the long term interests of 
electricity consumers.  (While this report separates the NEO into five sub-objectives, the 
relationship between these is often equally important. For example, in certain cases the 
pursuit of one objective may act in opposition to another objective. This is often the case 
when reliability is reduced in the case of a customer interruption in order to maintain overall 
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system security.) Further, these indicators define the scope of what NEM organisations are 
required to consider, potentially at the expense of other possible criteria for the long term 
interests of consumers.  The criteria within the NEO imply the use of KPIs, because 
evaluation is required as to whether a criterion is being met.  As such, the format of the 
Report Card is based on a series of criteria for the long term interests of consumers and 
associated performance measures or KPIs.   
 
From both the NEO and the literature review a list of 13 possible criteria for the long-term 
interest of consumers were identified:   
1. Electricity Price 
2. Electricity quality 
3. Electricity and electricity system safety 
4. Reliability of electricity supply and the national electricity system 
5. Security of electricity supply and the national electricity system 
6. Customer bills 
7. Environmental performance 
8. Customer demand management 
9. Customer energy efficiency 
10. Level of competition 
11. Protection of vulnerable consumers 
12. Customer satisfaction  
13. Responsiveness to the community 
From the literature review, a series of possible KPIs for each of the 13 criteria were 
identified.   
 
A.3 PART 3 – STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 
 
To gain stakeholder input into the Report Card process a survey was developed. A copy of 
the survey is in Appendix C.  The objective of the survey was to identify the views of these 
key stakeholders on: 
a) What they think are the long-term interests of electricity consumers 
b) What they believe to be the best KPIs that measure the performance of the 
NEM with respect to a) 
c) The adequacy of the current National Electricity Objective 
d) How well they think the NEM is performing with respect to the current 
objective. 
 
The NEM Report Card Survey was sent to 56 organisations across a range of sectors (see 
Appendix B for a full list). Reflecting the more disaggregated nature of consumer and 
environmental advocacy, a larger number of these organisations were approached in each 
sector.  A total of 29 usable responses were received.  The respondents are listed by 
organisational type in Table 53. 
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Table 53: Number of participants invited and responding in the survey  
Organisational Category Participants Invited 
No. 
Survey Respondents 
No. 
Consumer Advocates –  
Small Energy Users (residential and 
business) 
17 12 
Consumer Advocates –  
Medium to Large Energy Users  
5 1 
Electricity Industry – Clean Energy 7 6 
Electricity Industry – Fossil Fuel 4 1 
Electricity Industry – Retailers 1 0 
Electricity Industry – Networks 1 1 
Unions 4 1 
Environmental Groups 13 6 
Government Organisations 4 1 
Total 56 29 
 
A.4 PART 4 – CRITERIA AND KPI PRIORITISATION   
 
The survey results were the primary basis for selecting criteria and associated KPIs for 
inclusion in the Report Card.  Specifically, the answers to the survey question how important 
are the following KPIs for inclusion in this Report Card, were ranked.  To provide a robust 
analysis three rankings were applied, the first was a straight average of all participants’ 
answers.  However, given that a large number of responses were from consumer and 
environmental advocates, a second ranking gave an equal weight to all organisation types 
regardless of the number of survey respondents.  The third ranking was based purely on the 
responses of residential consumer advocates, to provide a consumer advocate perspective 
on what represents the interests of consumers.  
 
Table 54 presents the KPIs which scored in the top 15 of at least one of the three rankings. 
For the all participants and consumer advocates rankings of many of the highly scored KPIs 
are related to the long term interests of consumer criteria which are not currently included 
in the NEO.  One possible explanation for this is that survey participants could have been 
rating highly KPIs which they do not feel the NEM is currently addressing adequately. Despite 
differences in ranking there is some degree of agreement between the three ranking 
methods, particularly in relation Electricity Price.   
 
Figure 36 and Figure 38 graphically show the top 15 KPIs ranked by all participants’ 
responses and by organisational type respectively and Figures 38 and 39 show the ranking of 
the remaining KPIs listed in the survey.  Note, the colours of the bars in these figures 
correspond to their associated criteria for the long term interests of consumers.  
104 
 
Table 54: Average rank for each KPI and criteria 
Note * Indicates those KPIs that have been included in the Report Card 
Criteria  KPI 
Average Rank (by weighted score) 
All 
respondents 
Organisational 
Category 
Residential 
Consumer 
Advocate 
Price 
Retail price of electricity for 
residential customers (c/kWh)* 
1 1 1 
Environmental 
performance 
Annual greenhouse gas emissions 
from the electricity sector 
(tonnes CO2e/year)* 
2 22 2 
Level of 
Competition 
Extent of market concentration* =3 7 =3 
Environmental 
performance 
Greenhouse gas intensity of 
electricity supply (kg 
CO2e/MWh)* 
=3 17 =3 
Protection of 
vulnerable 
customers 
Number of disconnections of 
residential customers on 
payment plans and pensions* 
5 26 =3 
Customer Bills 
Average annual residential 
customers electricity bill as a 
proportion of household 
income* 
6 8 =3 
Customer 
satisfaction 
Number of complaints per year* 7 3 =12 
Protection of 
vulnerable 
consumers 
Number of households that are 
'energy poor' i.e. electricity costs 
are greater than 10% of 
household budget* 
8 4 19 
Customer 
satisfaction 
Surveyed customer satisfaction 
levels* 
9 5 16 
Price 
Retail price of electricity for small 
business customers (c/kWh)* 
=10 2 22 
Environmental 
performance 
Renewable energy as a 
proportion of total electricity 
generation  (% of total MWh)* 
=10 24 =12 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Electricity savings from energy 
efficiency programs as 
percentage of total electricity 
consumed (% of total MWh)* 
12 37 11 
Demand 
management 
Proportion of peak demand met 
through demand management 
programs (% of total MW peak)* 
13 41 =7 
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Reliability 
System Average Interruption 
Duration Index (SAIDI)* 
14 6 15 
Demand 
management 
Average demand as a percentage 
of peak demand (% of total 
MWpeak) 
15 27 =12 
Level of 
Competition 
Retail electricity margins =20 35 =7 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Energy intensity  (kWh per 
capita)* 
=20 36 19 
Protection of 
vulnerable 
customers 
Number of disconnections =22 20 =7 
Security of 
supply 
System-wide demand exceeding 
generation capacity - MWh of 
unmet load* 
=22 11 =25 
Safety 
Number of significant electricity 
incidents per year associated 
with the electricity supply 
industry* 
24 16 =25 
Protection of 
vulnerable 
consumers 
Number of disconnections more 
than once at the same address 
18 25 10 
Reliability 
Customer Average Interruption 
Duration Index (CAIDI) 
16 9 25 
Reliability 
Momentary Average Interruption 
Frequency Index (MAIFI) 
29 15 33 
Reliability 
System Average Interruption 
Frequency Index (SAIFI) 
16 10 19 
Quality 
Number of customer complaints 
related to voltage issues 
32 12 37 
Price 
Retail price of electricity for large 
business customers (c/kWh) 
27 13 36 
Customer 
satisfaction 
Call centre responsiveness - 
Percentage of calls abandoned or 
dropped 
31 14 37 
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Figure 37: Top 15 KPIs – Ranking based on average of all survey participants 
 
 
Note: 5= Very high importance, should definitely be used as indicator in the NEM Report 
Card and 1= Very low importance should definitely not be used as indicator in the NEM 
Report Card.  Thus the higher the score, the more people think it is an important indicator to 
include in the Report Card 
 
(See Table 54 for colour code reference.) 
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Figure 38: Top 15 KPIs – Ranking based on average of organisational category  
 
 
Note: 5= Very high importance, should definitely be used as indicator in the NEM Report 
Card and 1= Very low importance should definitely not be used as indicator in the NEM 
Report Card.  Thus the higher the score, the more people think it is an important indicator to 
include in the Report Card 
 
(See Table 54 for colour code reference.) 
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Figure 39: Remaining KPIs – Ranking based on average of all survey participants  
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Figure 40: Remaining KPIs – Ranking based on average of organisational category  
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The criteria selected for analysis for the Report Card included all those in the current NEO as 
they reflect what major stakeholders, i.e. the architects of the NEM, considered to be crucial 
to the long term interests of consumers.  This is despite the fact that most of the KPIs 
associated with these criteria (with the exception of residential electricity price) did not 
score highly in the “all participant” and “consumer advocate” rankings (Table 54).  There is 
one current NEO criterion for which none of the surveyed KPIs were used in the Report Card 
– Quality, as it was not possible to find reliable data for the quality related KPIs included in 
the survey.  Instead an alternative KPI was presented as described in section 4.4.3.   
 
Additional criteria selected for analysis and inclusion in this Report Card were those that 
corresponded with the top 15 KPIs weighted by all survey participants, thus representing the 
collective wisdom of consumer representatives, market stakeholders and experts.  It should 
be noted that the ‘all participants’ ranking and ‘consumer advocates’ ranking closely 
correlate, due to the large number of consumer advocate responses.  The list of criteria and 
KPIs analysed in this report are listed in Table 55. 
 
Table 55: Criteria and KPIs included in the Report Card 
CRITERIA KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATOR 
Reliability 
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
Reliability unserved energy 
Security of supply Estimated security unserved energy 
Quality Customer Severity Index 
Safety Lost time injury frequency 
Price 
Retail price of electricity for residential customers (c/kWh) 
Retail price of electricity for small business customers (c/kWh) 
Customer bills 
Average annual residential customers electricity bill as a proportion of 
household expenditure 
Environmental performance 
Annual greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector (tonnes CO2e/year) 
Greenhouse gas intensity of electricity supply (kg CO2e/MWh) 
Renewable energy as a proportion of total electricity generation (% of total 
MWh) 
Energy efficiency 
Electricity savings from energy efficiency programs as percentage of total 
electricity consumed (% of total MWh) 
Demand management 
Proportion of peak demand met through demand management programs (% of 
total MW peak) 
Protection of vulnerable 
customers 
Number of disconnections of residential customers on payment plans and 
pensions 
Number of households that are 'energy poor' (electricity costs are greater than 
10% of household budget) 
Customer satisfaction 
Number of complaints per year 
Surveyed customer satisfaction 
Level of competition Extent of market concentration 
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A.5 PART 5 – KPI DATA 
 
Once the KPIs which best reflected the long-term interests of consumers were chosen, the 
best method for measuring each KPI was determined.  To provide a grade for each KPI, the 
current status of each KPI was assessed using the most recent available data.  As some 
criteria had more than one KPI, after each KPI was graded, they would be aggregated into an 
overall grade for each criterion, by taking a simple average. 
 
To score the KPIs, a baseline measurement needs to be selected for each KPI. This indicates 
the period of time that the performance is assessed over. There are three broad base 
measurements that can be selected for each KPI: 
 Current status – an absolute or “snapshot” measure; 
 Short term trend – Annual change over time, such as this year’s performance 
compared with last year; and 
 Longer term trend – Change over a period of time, for example the period from prior 
to the introduction of electricity market reforms and the founding of the NEM, 1990 
to now.  
 
Wherever possible, this Report Card focuses on how the electricity sector in Australia has 
changed due to the introduction of the NEM.  Thus, the preferred period selected was 1990 
until the most recently available data – that is the decade prior to the introduction of the 
NEM and the decade since its introduction. This time period from 1990 enables analysis of 
the change that the NEM reforms have had on different measures of long term consumer 
interest. Therefore, indicators that show the change over time were prioritised for inclusion 
in the Report Chard.   This approach also minimises the effect of “noise” of annual change 
and instead examines the long-term trend.  However, if this Report Card were to become an 
annual process, using annual change measures would be more appropriate.  As such, where 
there was insufficient data to look over the longer time period, an annual change measure 
has been used.  Also on a limited number of KPIs a current status “snapshot” measure was 
used, where it was deemed that this information provided valuable additional insight.   
 
Determining the most appropriate base measure and associated benchmark has been a 
challenging process and the results should therefore be read with some caution.  Extensive 
research was undertaken into the data for each KPI, however, the process was constrained 
by the data available to measure and benchmark against.  In many cases, it was concluded 
that data available in the NEM simply was not transparent enough to provide a robust 
performance analysis.  Additionally, it should be noted that the scoring of each KPI selected 
for review in this Report involves a different approach to baseline data and benchmarking. 
Different approaches to baseline data and benchmarking can yield different grades, 
providing a different indication of how the NEM is performing.  
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A.6 PART 6 – KPI BENCHMARKING 
 
Benchmarking is the process of comparing something to a standard.  There are a number of 
possible approaches benchmarking.  
 
The purpose of this Report Card is to understand how well the NEM is operating in the long 
term interests of consumers.  The functioning of the NEM is a result of a range of factors, 
including current and historical regulations, institutions and practices (discussed in Sections 
0, 1 and 2) as well as the specific Australian context –  for example, the fact that Australia 
has a large land area with a low population density.   As such, within the context of this 
Report Card, all benchmarking approaches have benefits and limitations.  If an international 
benchmarking approach is used, where NEM data is compared to an international standard, 
Australian context-specific factors are ignored, however the impact of the Australian 
regulatory approaches is highlighted.  If current NEM performance is compared to historical 
NEM performance, Australian context factors and past Australian energy regulation are 
considered, but alternative approaches to energy regulation not used in Australia are not.  
Preference is given in this report to international benchmarking, as it enables the broadest 
possible comparison of best practice regulation of electricity with respect to the long term 
interests of consumers.   
 
However, the question of which exact benchmarking approach to use for each KPI was 
mainly answered by the availability of data.  Despite extensive research, it has not been 
possible to use one consistent benchmarking approach in this Report Card as there are 
significant data gaps or limitations both in baseline Australian data and in international and 
national benchmarking data.  As such, the benchmarking approaches adopted in this report 
are (in descending order of preference): 
 Comparing NEM data to OECD country data, specifically where the NEM ranks. 
 Comparing NEM data to non-OECD or partial OECD international data, specifically 
where the NEM ranks. 
 Comparing a NEM trend to progress towards a common international target. 
 Comparing a NEM trend to progress towards an explicit Australian target. 
 Comparing current NEM performance to historical NEM performance, either based 
on a trend or based on comparison with best and worst case performance. 
 
The output of this process is a grade from A–F (excluding E) for each KPI, where A is doing 
very well and F is doing very poorly.  Where insufficient data is available to provide a grade, 
UG or ungraded is noted.   The explanation of and rationale for the grading scale used for 
each KPI is outlined in the section of this Report devoted to that KPI (Sections 4.3.1-4.3.12).   
 
These grades are the basis of the NEM Report Card, from which recommendations were 
subsequently developed.  
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APPENDIX B - ORGANISATIONS INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 
 
Consumer advocates – residential 
 Moreland Energy Foundation Limited 
 Australian Council of Social Services 
 Alternative Technology Association 
 Uniting Care Australia Energy Project 
 Public Interest Advocacy Centre 
 Queensland Council of Social Services 
 Consumer Action Law Centre 
 Victorian Council of Social Services 
 St Vincent de Paul Society 
 Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre 
 Council on the Ageing (SA) 
 NSW Council of Social Services  
 Tasmanian Council of Social Service 
 South Australian Council of Social Service 
 Energy and Water Consumers' Advocacy Program 
 Ethnic Communities Council of NSW 
 Choice 
 Credit, Commercial and Consumer Law Program (CCCL) QUT 
 
Consumer advocates – business 
 Business Council of Australia 
 Australian Industry Group 
 Major Energy Users Incorporated 
 Shopping Centre Council 
 Energy Users Association of Australia 
 
Electricity industry - clean energy 
 Clean Energy Council 
 Australian Alliance to Save Energy  
 Australian Solar Energy Society 
 Bioenergy Australia 
 Energy Efficiency Council 
 Australian Geothermal Energy Association Inc 
 
Electricity industry - fossil fuel 
 National Generators Forum/Loy Yang Marketing Management Company 
 National Generators Forum 
 Energy Supply Association Australia 
 Minerals Council of Australia 
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Electricity industry - retailers 
 Energy Retailers Association of Australia  
 
Electricity industry - networks 
 Energy Networks Association 
 
Unions 
 ACTU 
 ETU 
 AMWU 
 United Voice 
 
Environmental groups 
 TCI 
 ACF 
 Greenpeace 
 Beyond Zero Emissions 
 Nature Conservation Council NSW 
 Environment Victoria 
 Queensland Conservation Council 
 Conservation Council of South Australia 
 Environment Tasmania 
 CANA 
 AYCC 
 ASEN 
 WWF 
 
Government organisations 
 Utility Regulators Forum 
 Australian Local Government Association 
 Energy and Water Ombudsman NSW 
 Energy and Water Ombudsman Victoria 
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APPENDIX C - NEM STAKEHOLDER SURVEY  
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